Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 3

Fall 9-1-2010

Using The Federal Communication Commission’s Tower
Construction Notification System As A Model For Siting Nuclear
Waste On Native American Land
Casey Zivin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/jece
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Casey Zivin, Using The Federal Communication Commission’s Tower Construction Notification
System As A Model For Siting Nuclear Waste On Native American Land, 2 Wash. & Lee J.
Energy, Climate & Env’t. 51 (2011), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/jece/vol2/iss1/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment by an authorized editor of Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Using The Federal Communication
Commission’s Tower Construction
Notification System As A Model For Siting
Nuclear Waste On Native American Land
By Casey Zivin*
Abstract
Since the advent of nuclear power in the United States in the mid-20th
century, the federal government has struggled to find a suitable location to
store the hazardous waste associated with nuclear power generation. In
1991, in an attempt to solve the problem of storing nuclear waste, the
federal government created grant programs which offered funding to states
and Native American tribes who volunteered to store nuclear waste on their
lands. One tribe in particular, the Skull Valley Goshute of Utah, viewed
storing nuclear waste as an opportunity to infuse their reservation with
monies. Further, because tribes enjoy sovereign status in the United States,
the Goshute believed their application could overcome state and federal
opposition. However, the Goshute’s application to store nuclear waste on
their reservation was denied by the federal government which used its
powers under the Federal Trust Doctrine to rule that storing nuclear waste
on the Goshute reservation would adversely affect the health and well-bring
of the Goshute tribe.
This Note explores the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine
and tribal sovereignty and how the Federal Communication Commission
(FCC) handled this conflict in the siting of cellular towers on Native
American land. Further, a proposal for a nuclear waste facility siting
system based on the FCC’s Cellular Tower Construction Notification
System is presented as a solution to the United States’ nuclear waste
storage problem. This new siting system would allow tribes to enter in to
lucrative contracts to store nuclear waste on their land while allowing the
tribes to maintain their full sovereign rights. In order for this new siting
system to work, the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine and tribal
*
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sovereignty must be reconciled by acknowledging that tribes have full selfdetermination limited only by externality moderations approved by the
tribes.
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I. Introduction
In the spring of 2009, President Barack Obama ceased almost all
funding for the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Repository Project in Nye County
Nevada.1 The President’s decision ended a twenty-two year debate
1. See Editorial, Mountain of Trouble: Mr. Obama Defunds the Nuclear Repository
at Yucca Mountain. Now What?, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2009, at A18, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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concerning where the United States’ nuclear waste should be stored
permanently and safely.2 As of 2008, the United States had 56,000 metric
tons of nuclear waste, an amount expected to more than double by the year
2035.3 Currently, that nuclear waste is stored in thirty-nine states across the
country in more than 121 facilities.4 As the country’s amount of nuclear
waste continues to grow, the need for long-term storage facilities becomes
more critical. While the federal government searches for solutions to our
country’s nuclear waste problem, there is a group of people who, in the
past, have shown a willingness to site nuclear waste on their land: Native
Americans.
After centuries of cultural oppression, many Native Americans have
left their reservations to live in cities and towns across the country.5 Tribal
members who have chosen to stay on reservations live on remote pockets of
land across the United States.6 Most of the land—far removed from centers
of human economic activity—has very little value,7 and the majority of the
Native American population lives in extreme poverty.8 Tribal leaders are
left with the unenviable task of finding commercial ventures to sustain the
current and future tribal population.9
dyn/content/article/2009/03/07/AR2009030701666.html [hereinafter Mountain of Trouble]
("President Obama has succeeded in killing the contentious project that remains unfinished
22 years after Congress selected the site.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
2. See id. (explaining the debate in Congress over where to locate nuclear waste and
the President's final decision to take the Yucca Mountain option off of the table).
3. See Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty
and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 331 (2009) ("[A]s of April 2008, the United
States had stockpiled over 56,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, an amount predicted to
increase to 119,000 metric tons by 2035.").
4. See Mountain of Trouble, supra note 1 ("[S]torage is spread over 121 aboveground sites located within 75 miles of more than 161 million people in 39 states.").
5. See Eric J. Lacey, Manifest Destiny’s New Face: “Soft-Selling” Tribal Heritage
Lands for Toxic Waste, 92 GEO. L.J. 405, 405–08 (2004) (illustrating the greater problem of
Native Americans being forced to sell their lands by narrating the plight of the ShoshoneBannock, a tribe that left the Fort Hall Indian Reservation and settled in rural Pocatello,
Idaho).
6. See id. at 425 (noting the economic isolation of tribal land, due in part to their
"remoteness and seclusion").
7. See id. (noting the usefulness of the land has been diminished by the isolation of
the land, pollution, and overuse).
8. See M.V. Gowda & Doug Easterling, Nuclear Waste and Native America: The
MRS Siting Exercise, 9 RISK 229, 246 (1998) ("According to the 1990 census, 50.7% of
Native Americans living on reservations have incomes below the federal poverty level.").
9. See Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A
Paradoxical Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. 267, 319–21 (1994) (stating that tribes must continually
search for potential sources of economic development in order to merely sustain selfsufficiency).
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One venture that tribal leaders have considered is creating monitored
retrievable storage (MRS) facilities to store nuclear waste on their lands.10
Objections to such facilities have come from both neighboring non-Native
American populations and members of the tribes themselves. Tribal
members opposed to MRS facilities argue that the economic benefit from
siting this type of facility on their land is illusory and the danger of storing
nuclear waste outweighs any economic benefits.11 Tribe members in favor
of nuclear waste storage argue that the economic benefits tribes would
receive would provide economic strength to reservations and produce funds
for education, healthcare, and jobs for future generations.12 Further,
proponents of storing nuclear waste argue that the nuclear waste trade can
potentially attract other industries, which can further boost the tribe’s
economy and make the tribe less dependent on the United States
government for funding.13
Regardless of the arguments for allowing or rejecting nuclear waste
facilities on their reservations, determining which government entities have
jurisdiction over tribes and reconciling the conflict between Native
American sovereignty and the Federal Trust Doctrine are essential for
creating a system that would allow tribes to voluntarily site nuclear waste
storage facilities on their tribal land. Currently the federal government has
asserted primary authority and has sided with opponents: officials have yet
to approve a proposal for siting nuclear waste on tribal land.14
Section II begins with the history of nuclear power regulation to show
how nuclear waste siting regulations have evolved to their current state.
Next, a case study involving the Skull Valley Goshute tribe’s attempt to site
nuclear waste on their land is presented to show why a new model is
necessary to resolve the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine and
tribal sovereignty.

10. See id. at 270 ("Native American nations must balance the potential economic
benefits of the waste trade against the potential environmental harm of nuclear waste
storage."); see also id. at 287 (explaining the MRS facility).
11. See id. at 275 (stating that some Native American leaders see the MRS projects as
merely another "big promise[]" from the federal government that will be "ecologically
disastrous" for the reservations and that the Native American people "won't ever see a dime
from it" (quoting Margaret L. Knox, Their Mother’s Keeper, SIERRA, Mar./Apr. 1993, at
57)).
12. See Collins, supra note 9, at 274–75 ("These are tools for self-determination and
are necessary for tribes to escape economic domination by the U.S. government, to regain
tribal power, and to preserve the tribe for future generations.").
13. See id. (noting that tribes rely on the federal government to supply them with
funding necessary to tribal infrastructure and development).
14. See Davies, supra note 3, at 341–48 (listing various attempts to approve proposals
for siting nuclear waste on tribal reservations).
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Section III presents the history of federal and state jurisdiction powers
over Native Americans to explain why the Federal Trust Doctrine has
overpowered tribal sovereignty when tribes have tried to site nuclear waste
facilities on their reservations.
Section IV argues that cellular tower siting is similar to nuclear waste
siting and therefore that cell tower siting procedures should be implemented
for nuclear waste siting. Then, historic preservation laws and the legislative
history are presented to explain why cellular tower siting procedures have
evolved to their present state.
Section V discusses the problems that arise in trying to create a
regulatory system for nuclear waste and goes on to propose that a new
regulatory system, modeled on cellular tower siting procedures, should be
created for nuclear waste.
The paper concludes that Native American tribes should be allowed to
exercise their sovereign powers and be allowed to practice full selfdetermination, without challenges from the federal government or states, in
deciding whether to site nuclear waste repositories on their reservations.
II. Nuclear Power in the United States
In the mid-twentieth century, with the advent of nuclear power,
federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction issues began to intensify. Tensions
began to rise soon after the Atomic Energy Act of 194615 was passed and
increased as the federal government began mining uranium on tribal lands.
The government tapped civilian workers to mine and produce resources
necessary for generating nuclear power, encouraged states to build nuclear
power plants, pressured states and tribes to store nuclear waste as part of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act,16 and later encouraged them to store nuclear
waste in MRS facilities on their land. These tensions are particularly clear
in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute, who have spent years attempting to
site nuclear waste on their land using MRS facilities.17
A. The Creation of Laws Governing Nuclear Power
Prior to 1946, states and tribes had never been concerned with nuclear
waste nor with uranium mining on their land, but in 1946, the federal
15. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 70-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
16. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2000)).
17. See infra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (describing the case of the Skull
Valley Goshute).
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government passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 that gave control of
nuclear technology to the civilian-run Atomic Energy Commission.18
Shortly after the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed, large deposits of
uranium, the core ingredient in developing nuclear power, were discovered
on many reservations.19 The federal government determined it was easiest
and most cost-effective to mine the uranium on tribal lands, which they
held in trust.20 The decision to mine uranium on tribal lands gave numerous
jobs to tribe members, benefiting the tribes economically, but the impact on
the environment was devastating.21 Native Americans were left occupying
land surrounded by highly radioactive waste, which the federal government
and private corporations made little effort to clean up.22
A few years after mining began to intensify, Congress passed the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954,23 which developed the structure for how the
nuclear industry operates.24 The main purpose of the Act was to encourage
civilians to invest in nuclear power and to build nuclear power plants.25
Further, the Act intended to "promote world peace, improve the general
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in
private enterprise."26 In order to further encourage private companies to
build nuclear power plants, the Atomic Energy Commission promised to
reprocess nuclear waste and planned to transport nuclear waste after it was
removed from nuclear reactors.27 However, in 1974, Congress passed the
18. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 70-85, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (legislating federal
government ownership of all nuclear material and facilities, while civilians were limited to
performing contract work for the government).
19. See Louis G. Leonard III, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environmental
Justice in the Mescalero Apache’s Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 651, 655 (1997) ("The discovery of large uranium deposits on reservation lands in the
1950's [sic] forced Native Americans to become unwilling participants in the experiment
with nuclear power.").
20. See id. ("Because this land legally was held in trust by the federal government, it
was the easiest and most economical for the government to mine.").
21. See id. ("[T]ribal members became the obvious choice for a labor force to staff the
uranium mines. These mining jobs were highly dangerous and often caused the
contamination of an entire tribe or village.").
22. See id. ("[T]he federal government and private interests made little effort to clean
up after themselves.").
23. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
24. See Collins, supra note 9, at 277 ("[T]he Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . . . laid out
the structure through which the nuclear industry operates today.").
25. See id. ("The 1954 Act encouraged civilian ownership of ‘both energy production
and utilization facilities.’").
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (1988)).
27. See Collins, supra note 9, at 277 ("The AEC initially planned to reprocess waste
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Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,28 which dissolved the Atomic Energy
Commission and gave the Energy Research and Development
Administration research and development responsibilities while bestowing
regulatory and licensing functions on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).29 Thus, the NRC became responsible for transporting and storing
the United States’ nuclear waste.
B. The Federal Government’s Attempt at Nuclear Waste Siting
Until the late 1970s, the federal government emphasized expanding
nuclear power as quickly as possible with no regard to the environmental
ramifications.30 The government failed to develop a plan for what to do
with all the waste generated by mining, milling, and using uranium in the
production of nuclear power.31 The failure to foresee the enormous amount
of hazardous waste associated with nuclear power has created a serious
ecological threat, which has been characterized by Congressman Edward
Markey as, "the most potentially serious environmental hazard . . . fac[ing]
the health and safety of people on this planet . . . for the next 10,000
years . . . ."32
Mounting nuclear waste led Congress to enact the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act (NWPA)33 in 1982, which had three key components. The first
component of the NWPA created a program to research and find permanent
geologic structures that could be used to store nuclear waste.34 These
repositories would be owned and operated by the federal government and
and promised utilities that nuclear waste would be transferred from utilities shortly after its
removal from reactors. In response to this federal initiative, many utilities built nuclear
power plants.").
28. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5801, et seq.); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5879,
2000(d) (specific sections of the Code changed by the 1974 Act).
29. See Collins, supra note 9, at 278 (explaining that the Energy Reorganization Act
gave regulatory and licensing authority to the NRC and gave research and development
responsibilities to the Energy Research and Development Administration).
30. See id. at 278–79 ("The buildup of uncontrolled nuclear waste resulted from a
deliberate policy of the United States government . . . of emphasizing rapid expansion of
nuclear power and de-emphasizing nuclear safety and health.").
31. See id. at 278 ("[T]he United States cavalierly mined, milled, and used uranium
with no pre-planning for the safe disposal of the inevitable waste.").
32. 128 CONG. REC. 26,302 (1982) (statement of Rep. Markey).
33. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2000)).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132 (outlining the requirements for candidate sites); see
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131–10135 (2000) (laying out a structure by which new locations
would be found in the United States for the purpose of storing nuclear waste).
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funded by taxing nuclear power generation.35 The second component
dictated that once the waste was taken to a federal repository, the
government would take full ownership and responsibility for the storage of
the waste.36 Third, the NWPA required the Department of Energy (DOE)
to conduct a study regarding the use of MRS facilities, where nuclear waste
could temporarily be stored, as well as potential sites for permanent nuclear
waste storage.37
In 1987, amendments were made to the NWPA, which directed the
DOE to study one potential location for permanent nuclear waste storage:
Yucca Mountain, Nevada.38 However, because Yucca Mountain was not
going to be able to accept nuclear waste until after the year 2010, the
government focused its attention on locations for MRS facilities to hold
nuclear waste until Yucca Mountain was ready.39
C. Siting Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities
The DOE believed MRS facilities were the short-term answer to the
country’s nuclear waste storage problems because MRS facilities could
store nuclear waste safely, with minimal impact to the environment and
communities living near them.40 The DOE established three criteria for its
first attempt at siting MRS facilities. First, the DOE looked for locations on

35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131 et seq. (establishing federal responsibility for the waste
and spent fuel and funds for the selection of an appropriate storage site).
36. Id.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132 (recommending candidate sites and directing the Secretary
of Energy to begin the study of candidate sites).
38. See Jon D. Erickson, Duane Chapman & Ronald E. Johnny, Monitored Retrievable
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Indian Country: Liability, Sovereignty, and
Socioeconomics, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 73, 76 (1994) ("After considering various locations
for a repository, the 1987 Amendments to the NWPA (the 1987 Amendments) directed the
[Department of Energy] to exclusively study the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada."); see also
William La Jeunesse, Tracking Your Taxes: The High Price of Nuclear Waste,
FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/11/04/tracking-taxeshigh-price-nuclear-waste/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (noting that President Barack Obama
has recently discontinued the Yucca Mountain project, meaning that siting of nuclear waste
on tribal lands may gain a renewed interest) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
39. See Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 76 (noting the NWPA also authorized the
DOE to "study and site both a repository for permanent disposal and an MRS facility for the
purpose of temporary storage, consolidation, and repackaging of waste").
40. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Dep’t of Energy, A Monitored
Retrievable Storage Facility: Technical Background Information 6–8 (1991), available at
http://www.energy.gov/media/Monitored_Retrievable_Storage_Background.pdf (outlining
the simple functions MRS facilities will perform and predicting the minimal impact on the
environs surrounding the MRS facilities).
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federal lands.41 Second, the locations had to be in the eastern half of the
United States,42 where most nuclear waste is generated, and third, the site
had to be at least 1100 acres and not near any operating reactors.43 Using
these criteria, the DOE identified eleven possible MRS sites and focused on
studying three located in Tennessee more extensively.44 The site they
found that fit the criteria most perfectly was owned by the state of
Tennessee, and in 1987 the DOE submitted its final proposal to Congress
for the construction of a MRS facility there.45 However, the proposal was
denied after strong opposition by the public and local government.46
After this failed attempt, the DOE created the Nuclear Waste
Negotiator position to facilitate MRS siting and adopted a new siting
approach.47 The DOE decided to try to find a state or Native American
tribe to voluntarily site a MRS facility on their land.48 In 1991, the DOE
authorized a grant program in which the Nuclear Waste Negotiator invited
41. Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Dep’t of Energy, Screening and
Identification of Sited for a Proposed Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility 1–4 (1985)
(DOE/RW-0023) [hereinafter Screening and Identification].
42. See Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 77–79 (noting that the DOE originally
wanted to site nuclear waste facilities in the eastern half of the United States to minimize the
risks in transporting the waste; however, once the DOE concluded there were no suitable
sites in the eastern half of the United States, this criterion was eliminated); see also
SCREENING AND IDENTIFICATION, supra note 41, at 1 ("The eleven sites are located within a
preferred geographic region where an MRS facility can significantly reduce spent fuel
shipment miles and related impacts.").
43. See SCREENING AND IDENTIFICATION, supra note 41, at 1 ("Each site has at least
1100 available acres without known land-use conflicts such as operating or planned
commercial nuclear power plants.").
44. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Dep’t of Energy,
Monitored Retrievable Storage Submission to Congress: The Proposal 13–14 (1987)
[hereinafter MRSS] (describing the selection process).
45. See id. at 13 ("Of the three candidate sites, the Clinch River site in the Roane
County portion of Oak Ridge is recommended to the Congress as the preferred site . . . .").
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 10162(a) (1988) (Subtitle C of the NWPA of 1982 amended)
("The proposal . . . to locate a monitored retrievable storage facility . . . on the Clinch River
in the Roane County portion of Oak Ridge . . . with alternative sites on the Oak Ridge
Reservation . . . and on the former site of a proposed nuclear powerplant in Hartsville . . . is
annulled and revoked.").
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10241–10251, 10242(b)(2) (NWPA of 1982 amended by Title
IV) ("The Negotiator shall attempt to find a State or . . . tribe willing to host a repository or
monitored retrievable storage facility at a technically qualified site on reasonable terms and
shall negotiate with any State or Indian tribe which expresses [such] an interest . . . .").
48. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
Preliminary Site Requirements and Considerations for a Monitored Retrievable Storage
Facility iii (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Site Requirements],
available at
http://www.energy.gov/media/MRS_Preliminary_Site_Requirements.pdf ("The Negotiator
is to seek to negotiate a proposed agreement with a State or Indian Tribe willing to site an
MRS facility at a technically qualified site.").
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state governors and tribal leaders to request grants to be used to research the
feasibility of constructing MRS facilities on their lands.49 The grant system
was to last until 1993 and had three phases.50 Phase I offered $100,000
grants for governors and tribes to do independent research on MRS
facilities.51 Phase II-A offered $200,000 grants to continue research, and
Phase II-B offered up to $2.8 million grants to fund educational outreach
programs, to identify potential sites and begin environmental assessments,
and to enter formal negotiations.52 After all of the studies were completed,
tribes or governors could enter into negotiations with the DOE regarding
the compensation for siting the MRS facility and procedures for operating
the facility.53 By the time the application deadline for grants expired in
1993, nine of the twelve Phase I grants were awarded to Native American
tribes, all nine of the Phase II-A grant applications were made by tribes, and
both Phase II-B grant applications were made by tribes.54 These statistics
show that Native American tribes were the people willing to bear the
burden of this nation’s nuclear waste. One of those tribes was the Skull
Valley band of Goshute Native Americans in western Utah.55
D. The Skull Valley Goshute Tribe’s Efforts to Obtain a Nuclear Waste
Facility
The Goshute tribe was an ideal candidate to host MRS facilities
because of their remote location in western Utah.56 The Goshute tribe has
inhabited a desolate area in western Utah, known as Skull Valley, for more
than 800 years, originally subsisting on small game and wild vegetables.57
After Spanish missionaries and fur trappers came in contact with the
Goshute, the missionaries urged travelers to take a different route West
49. Office of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Negotiator, 1992 Annual Report to Congress 1–2
(1993).
50. See Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 79–80 (explaining the chronological progress
of the grant system).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 80.
53. See id. ("Upon completion of feasibility studies, a tribe may then enter into formal
negotiations with the DOE . . . [i]nclud[ing] details regarding the siting and operation of an
MRS, as well as formulating compensation in the form of cash payments and benefits.").
54. Id. at 82.
55. See Davies, supra note 3, at 292, 332 (noting that a Goshute tribe member filed an
application). But see infra notes 79–84 and accompanying text (regarding environmental
justice campaign led by Goshute tribe members in opposition to Leon Bear’s pursuit of
nuclear waste disposal).
56. See id. at 295 (describing expansive Goshute territory in the Utah West Desert).
57. See generally id. at 294–95 (regarding traditional survival methods in the Goshute
culture).
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because the Goshute land was devoid of resources.58 After numerous
conflicts with settlers in the area, the Goshute entered into a treaty with the
United States in 1863 that allowed construction of military posts, mining
facilities, and rail lines on their territory in exchange for $1,000 to be paid
by the government every year for twenty years.59 A year later, the
government tried to remove the Goshute from the area to make room for
expanding military outposts and mining operations and relocate them to a
reservation hundreds of miles to the East.60 However, the Goshute refused,
arguing that the land belonged to their fathers and they had a right to stay
there.61 After this attempt failed, and after another failed attempt to relocate
them in 1871, the government gave up and mostly forgot about them. 62
Finally in 1911, an agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was sent to
meet with the Goshute, and following the agent’s report, the government
created an eighty-acre reservation in Skull Valley for the Goshute.63 A few
years later, President Woodrow Wilson expanded the Skull Valley
reservation to encompass 18,000 acres.64 In addition, the BIA set up a
school and houses on the reservation.65 The influx of federal funding soon
dried up, and by 1936 the BIA had ceased funding the Skull Valley
Goshute, arguing that the tribe was too small to warrant government
funding, and tried, again, to force the Goshute to move off of the land.66
The tribe refused, and the BIA gave up for good.67 However, by the end of
58. See DEAN L. MAY, UTAH: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY 24 (1987) (describing Spaniards’
expedition through Utah in search of easily passable route to California); see also id. at 28
(explaining the inventive survival methods of the Goshute in a harsh desert environment).
59. Davies, supra note 3, at 300 (summarizing the terms of the treaty).
60. See id. at 301 (addressing various strategies for removing the Goshute).
61. See id. (concerning struggles between the Goshute and the federal government of
the United States); see also Steven J. Crum, The Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Tribe—
Deeply Attached to Their Native Homeland, 55 UTAH HIST. Q. 250, 251–52 (1987) (evoking
Goshute cultural heritage and connection to the landscape).
62. See Davies, supra note 3, at 301–02 (recounting government efforts to remove the
Goshute in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
63. Id. at 302; Exec. Order No. 1539 (May 29, 1912), reprinted in Executive Orders
Relating to Indian Reservations 1855–1922, at 168 (1975) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
64. Exec. Order No. 2699 (Sept. 7, 1917), reprinted in 4 Indian Affairs: Laws and
Treaties 1049 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1929) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment); Exec. Order No. 2809 (Feb. 15, 1918), reprinted in
4 Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 1049 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1929) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
65. See Crum, supra note 61, at 260 (describing BIA actions to bring development to
the Goshute reservation).
66. See id. at 261, 263–64 (regarding the BIA showing a declining amount of interest
in the Goshute).
67. See Davies, supra note 3, at 303 (noting that, notwithstanding the ongoing efforts
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World War II, the Skull Valley Goshute reservation had become
"surrounded by chemical weapons, military testing facilities, and toxic
waste."68
When the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was appointed and began to meet
with tribes to discuss the grant system, the Skull Valley Goshute decided to
take part in the program.69 Mary Allen, a former vice chair of the tribe,
explained that the MRS facility would help insure the future of her tribe.70
The economic gain would enable the tribe to educate future generations
about the history of the Goshute and would keep their culture alive.71 The
tribe was granted the $100,000 Phase I grant, as well as the $200,000 Phase
II-A grant.72 The tribe used the money to fund a five-year intensive study
regarding the MRS process, how the waste was stored, and what the
dangers were.73 Tribe members traveled to France, England, Sweden, and
Japan to see MRS facilities currently in use.74 Further, one tribe member
took a month-long internship at a nuclear power plant to learn more about
the process of creating nuclear power and how the waste was stored.75
The application deadline for the grant program had expired before the
Goshute had finished their research and decided they wanted to build a
MRS facility, but a consortium of eight electric utility companies
approached the Goshute and began negotiations to build a private facility.76
by the BIA to advocate removal as late as 1942, the Goshutes prevailed and the BIA
relented).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 332, 337 (describing decision by limited number of tribal members to
seek grants from DOE, in contravention of traditional consensus-based governance among
the Goshute).
70. See
Private
Fuel
Storage,
INTERIM
STORAGE
INC.,
http://www.interimstorageinc.com/private-fuel-storage (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (explaining
rationale of developer seeking to store nuclear waste on Goshute lands) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
71. See generally id. (expressing view that the storage of nuclear waste would yield
economic value for the Goshute).
72. Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 80–81.
73. Skull Valley: The Documentary: Interview with Leon Bear, KUED,
http://www.kued.org/productions/skullvalley/documentary/interviews/bear.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
74. See id. (describing grants that the Goshute received from the Department of
Energy and visits taken by Goshute tribe members to international nuclear facilities).
75. See Peter Ritter, Nuke ‘Em! Excel Energy Spearheads a High-Stakes Plan to Store
Nuclear Waste on a Tiny, Dirt-Poor Indian Reservation in the Utah Desert, CITY PAGES
MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL
(May
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.citypages.com/content/printVersion/14839 (providing an overview of the effort
to store nuclear waste on the land of the Skull Valley Goshute) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
76. See Charles Seabrook, Utilities Offer Millions: Poor Utah Tribe Gambles on
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In May 1997, the Goshute signed a lease agreement with a corporate entity
representing the consortium, and three days later the BIA conditionally
signed off on the lease.77 The project would have provided an influx of
money and created numerous jobs for members of the tribe; the lease would
have provided the means to keep the Goshute tribe, and culture, alive.78
The plan was not without opposition.79 Some tribe members believed
a MRS facility would be too dangerous and were worried their land would
be destroyed.80 Others felt tribal leadership was corrupt.81 The opposition
continued to swell as tribe members accused Leon Bear, the tribal
chairman, of silencing tribal members who opposed the waste plan and
depriving them of project monies.82 Bear even cancelled several tribal
chairman elections to ensure he remained in power.83 Soon Goshutes on
other reservations, environmental justice advocates, churches, and other
environmental groups joined in opposition against the proposal.84 Even the
Nuclear Waste, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 22, 2002, at 1A (noting that in 1993 the U.S.
Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator lost its budget but that the Goshutes conducted
further negotiations with Private Fuel Storage, the utility group).
77. See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record of Decision for the Construction and
Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on the Reservation of
the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians (Band) in Tooele County, Utah 4–5 (Sept. 7,
2006) http://www.deq.utah.gov/issues/no_high_level_waste/index.htm (follow the link
below "Documents") (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter ISFSI] ("In May 1997, the
Band and PFS signed the First Amended and Restated Lease (‘first lease’) for the proposed
ISFSI. . . . On May 23, 1997, the Superintendent of the BIA Uintah and Ouray Agency . . .
signed a ‘conditional approval’ of the first lease that would allow PFS to begin ISFSI
construction . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and
the Environment).
78. See Davies, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing the numerous potential benefits of the
PFS project).
79. See id. at 335 (introducing a tribe member in opposition of the plan, Margene
Bullcreek, who "was so strongly opposed that she formed a grass roots group . . . in an effort
to put brakes on the plans").
80. See id. at 335–36 (discussing the opinions of two tribe members, Bullcreek and
Sammy Blackbear).
81. See id. at 336–37 (giving Blackbear’s opinion that the PFS plan would "corrupt[]
tribal custom").
82. See id. ("Some tribal members also alleged that Bear had shut out those members
who disagreed with the waste plan, depriving them of project monies and a forum to be
heard."); see also Judy Fahys, The High Price of Dissent, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 6, 2003, at
B1 (giving examples of some problems experienced by some members of the opposition,
with specific reference to how the Tribal Chairman, Leon Bear, was handling the situation).
83. See Davies, supra note 3, at 337 ("Bear’s term as chairman, in fact, was set to
expire in 2004, but he canceled seven straight elections on the grounds of an insufficient
quorum, thus keeping himself in power as acting chairman."); see also Deborah Bulkeley,
Goshute Elections Are Contested, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov. 3, 2006, at B4 (discussing
the contested elections that have taken place in an effort to keep current Chairman Leon
Bear and his supporters in office).
84. See Davies, supra note 3, at 337–38 (introducing a number of people and groups
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governor of Utah, Michael Leavitt, joined in opposition.85 However, due to
how tribal sovereignty is currently interpreted, the decision rested with the
federal government.86
The NRC completed an environmental impact statement87 that was
reviewed by the BIA and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).88 The
environmental impact statement found that the project posed little threat to
the safety of the Goshute and surrounding populations, and in the end the
NRC approved the proposal.89 In March 2001, after hearing of the
approval, the legislature of Utah passed, and Governor Leavitt signed, a
number of bills that attempted to block nuclear waste from being brought
into the state.90 The Goshute filed a federal lawsuit against the state, and
the courts found that the bills were preempted by federal regulation.91
After Leavitt’s defeat in federal court, Utah’s five-member
congressional delegation began exerting political pressure to have the
proposal denied.92 By December 2005, Senator Orrin Hatch had persuaded
who were also opposed to the PFS plan, including Bullcreek’s Ohngo Guadadeh Devia, the
Confederated Goshute Tribe in Deep Creek, and Winona LaDuke, "a nationally known
Native American and environmental justice advocate").
85. See id. at 338 ("Utah’s governor at the time, Michael Leavitt, wanted to stop the
Goshutes’ plan before it was even set.").
86. See id. at 338–39 (recognizing that the federal government, specifically the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, makes the ultimate decision regarding licensing this
particular storage proposal).
87. The purpose of environmental impact statements is to evaluate the positive and
negative effects a project will have on the landscape. See National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f, 4332 (2000) (discussing a number of justifications
for environmental impact statements).
88. See Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards, NRC, 1 NUREG-1714, Final
Environmental Impact Statement for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation on the
Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, iii (2001), available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1714/v1/cover.pdf [hereinafter
FEIS] (outlining the purpose of the environmental impact statement and which agencies
must give approval to the PFS proposal for it to continue).
89. See id. at xxix–xxxii, available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr1714/v1/exec-summ.pdf (summarizing the PFS proposal to the
four involved federal agencies: the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Surface Transportation
Board).
90. See Davies, supra note 3, at 340 ("By March 2001, Leavitt had delivered on his
promise [to stop the Goshutes’ plan]. He signed into law a series of bills attempting to
prevent the delivery of high-level nuclear waste into the state.").
91. See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1250
(D. Utah 2002) (holding that Utah’s statutes at issue were preempted by the Atomic Energy
Act), aff’d, Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir.
2004).
92. See Davies, supra note 3, at 341–43 (outlining some of the ways that Utah’s
congressional delegation were able to use their political pressure to aid in stopping the PFS
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the two biggest private investors in the consortium to back out of the deal.93
Utah’s five-member congressional delegation believed that the proposed
site’s proximity to an Air Force training base, coupled with the potential for
terrorist attacks, made the nuclear waste facility too dangerous.94
Undeterred, the NRC granted the consortium’s proposal for the nuclear
waste site in September 2005.95 This victory, however, was short-lived. In
January 2006, "Utah Congressman Rob Bishop . . . succeeded in attaching
to a defense spending bill a measure designating a vast expanse of federal
land north of the Goshute reservation—over 100,000 acres—as a formal
‘wilderness area.’"96 In essence, the defense spending bill created a land
barrier around the Goshute, preventing the Goshute from using roadways
and railways to transport waste to the waste facility.97 Thus, it did not
matter whether the proposal for the storage facility had been granted,
because the Goshute had no way to transport the waste to the facility.98
Leavitt had failed in his attempt to block transportation corridors because of
federal preemption, but the wilderness designation was federally mandated
and could not be preempted.99 In September 2006, the BIA reversed its
approval of the MRS facility on the Goshute reservation, citing their
concern for the health and well-being of the Goshute.100 However, it was
plan).
93. See id. at 342 ("[T]wo of PFS’s biggest backers, the Southern Company and Xcel
Energy, PFS’s majority stockholder, announced that they would no longer support the
project.").
94. See Joe Bauman, Nuclear Storage Battle Fires Up, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 18, 2005,
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/600119494/Nuclear-storage-battle-fires-up.html?pg=1
(last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (commenting that "[m]any of the planes [from Hill Air Force
Base] carry live ordnance, increasing the danger should an aircraft crash into the PFS
facility") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
95. See Private Fuel Storage, 62 N.R.C. 403, 405 (2005) (denying the petition for
review and authorizing "the NRC to issue a license to construct and operate the PFS
facility").
96. Davies, supra note 3, at 343; see also Utah National Guard Readiness Act, H.R.
3651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008) (conveying approximately 431 acres of land adjacent to Camp
Williams to Utah for the use of the Utah National Guard, with a specific provision included
to financially penalize the state for storing hazardous materials on site).
97. See Davies, supra note 3, at 343 ("The wilderness designation built on an earlier
effort by Governor Leavitt to erect a ‘land moat’ around the Goshutes.").
98. See id. ("The idea was simple: [i]f the Goshutes could not use surrounding
transportation corridors to move waste to the site, whether they had a storage license would
be irrelevant.").
99. See id. (suggesting that the "wilderness effort" avoided the preemption problem
encountered in the earlier proposed solution because it was enacted through a congressional
mandate).
100. See ISFSI, supra note 77, at 19 ("Upon weighing the benefits to the Band against
the significant uncertainties and other factors . . . we conclude that it is not consistent with
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clear to all of those involved that the main reason for the BIA reversing
their approval of the MRS facility was the considerable political pressure
Congress had applied.101
The Goshute have not given up. In July 2007 they sued the U.S.
Department of the Interior, challenging the decision to deny the MRS
facility.102 On July 26, 2010, the judge vacated the U.S. Department of the
Interior’s decision to deny the Goshute permission to build the MRS facility
and remanded the proposal back to the U.S. Department of the Interior for
reconsideration.103 Even if the U.S. Department of the Interior allows the
Goshute to build the facility, they will likely face strong opposition to their
proposal, as evidenced in the tribe’s previous battles. While the case
continues to work its way through the courts, the bigger question is: what
happens to the Skull Valley Goshute now? They still live on barren land
surrounded by facilities such as chemical weapons plants, military testing
grounds, and toxic waste.104 An MRS facility was a chance for the Goshute
to infuse their tribe with the means to survive, but now constructing a
nuclear waste facility is unlikely to happen.105 It is ironic that the trust
doctrine, a mechanism used to insure the protection and survival of tribes, is
what ultimately led to the denial of the proposal, a decision that could
signal the end of the Skull Valley Goshute as a people, culture, and tribe.

the conduct expected of a prudent trustee to approve a proposed lease that promotes storing
[spent nuclear fuel] on the reservation."). The BIA said the EIS did not evaluate the impact
on the tribe when the waste was actually removed from the MRS facility, there was no
timetable for how long the waste would stay on the reservation, and there was no assurance
of law enforcement on the reservation. Id. at 20–25.
101. See Davies, supra note 3, at 344–45 ("[I]t . . . was plain that the decisions were
based more heavily in politics than reasoned decisionmaking . . . .").
102. See Amended Complaint at 2–3 Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Cason,
(D. Utah July 20, 2007) (No. 2:07cv00526) 2007 WL 5354505 (outlining the plaintiff’s case
and praying for relief in the form of one of the five potential outcomes set forth by the
plaintiff’s complaint).
103. See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Davis, No. 07-cv-0526-DME-DON,
2010 WL 2990781, at *12 (D. Utah July 26, 2010) (vacating the Department of the Interior’s
Calvert and Cason Records on Decisions and remanding PFS’s right-of-way application
back to that agency).
104. See Davies, supra note 3, at 303 (giving the history of the Goshute tribe,
particularly with respect to their geographical location and its features).
105. See Press Release, Bob Bennett, U.S. Senator, Bennett Hails News that PFS Loses
Final
Push
to
Bring
Nuclear
Waste
to
Utah
(Sept.
7,
2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20060923023130/bennett.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=26265
2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (announcing the denial of both PFS’s Bureau of Land
Management application for a right-of-way for transporting high-level nuclear waste and
their Bureau of Indian Affairs application a nuclear waste storage facility to be located on
tribal lands) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
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This case study serves as an example of the legal barriers that Native
American tribes face when they try to exercise their sovereign status.
Moreover, the Goshute tribe’s story exemplifies the broader problem of
state and federal governments stifling the economic opportunities of Native
American tribes. Although the Goshutes were able to overcome legal
challenges from the state of Utah, their proposal for a nuclear waste facility
was ultimately denied because the federal government used the Federal
Trust Doctrine to overrule the power of the tribe’s sovereign status. The
first step in resolving the conflict between Native American sovereign
status and the trust doctrine is to understand how the two powers were
created and how courts interpret the two powers.
III. The Creation of Tribal Sovereignty and the Federal Trust Doctrine
The interplay between Tribal sovereignty, State jurisdiction, and
Federal jurisdiction are all important forces when nuclear waste siting is at
issue. Tribes contend that due to their sovereign status, they should be free
to site nuclear waste on their land if they choose to do so.106 Federal
government officials believe that, pursuant to the Trust Doctrine, they
should be able to veto tribes who have decided to site nuclear waste on their
land.107 Further, state officials believe that because nuclear waste must
travel on their roadways and railways in order to reach MRS facilities on
tribal land, they should also have the power to deny tribes the right to store
nuclear waste on their land.108 Analyzing the history of each entity’s power
is essential in sorting out whether tribes have an ultimate right to site
nuclear waste on their land or if their sovereignty is controlled by federal or
state jurisdictional powers.
A. Tribal Sovereignty
Tribal sovereignty is not a power that was delegated by Congress;
rather it is seen as a pre-existing power retained by the tribes.109 Tribal
sovereignty is accepted as a form of international law, where the
106. See Davies, supra note 3, at 334–35 ("[T]he [Goshute] tribe very much sees that
sovereignty as bound up in their choice to accept nuclear waste.").
107. See id. at 308 ("At its most basic level, the trust doctrine is precisely what it
implies, a duty of the federal government, acting as trustee, to protect a res, a tribal property
interest that has been placed in trust for beneficiaries, namely, tribes and tribal members.").
108. See id. at 340–41 (outlining the ways that the Utah state government attempted to
legislate to prevent the storage of nuclear waste within state boundaries, including
preventing passage along the state’s roads and highways).
109. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 666 (recognizing that tribal power is "based on the
concept of a pre-existing Native sovereignty").
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relationship of the federal government and tribes is analogous to a more
powerful nation having dominance over a weaker one.110 While tribes are
subject to the legislative authority of the federal government and can rely
on the federal government for protection against states trying to exercise
authority over them, tribes are otherwise independent.111 The wording of
the United States Constitution in regard to Native Americans reflects the
concept of treating tribes under international law.112 The Constitution states
that Native Americans are not taxed, and the Indian Commerce Clause
groups tribes with other sovereign entities when considering the extent of
federal power to regulate tribal commerce.113 Both of these mandates
recognize the sovereign status of tribes and their members.114
The independent power of tribes was reinforced in early Supreme
Court Cases.115 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,116 the Supreme Court held
that the federal government had a general duty to protect Native American
rights and compared the relationship of Native Americans and the federal
government to that of a "ward to his guardian."117 Moreover, in Worcester
v. Georgia,118 Chief Justice Marshall concluded that "a weaker power does
not surrender its independence, its right to self-government, by associating
with a stronger [power], and taking its protection."119 Therefore, tribal
authority controls all internal self-governing matters, unless that power has
been limited by federal plenary power or treaty.120
110. See id. (discussing the source of tribal powers through international law concepts).
111. See id. (suggesting the relationship between Native tribes and the federal
government is analogous to the dominance of a weaker nation by a stronger nation—tribes
are independent aside from the necessity to yield to the laws of the dominant nation and a
possible dependence on that nation for protection).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.").
113. See id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("[E]xcluding Indians not taxed . . . .").
114. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 666 (recognizing that "[t]he two references to
‘Indians’ in the Constitution indicate their status as independent sovereigns").
115. See id. at 667 (introducing early instances where the Supreme Court acknowledged
Indian tribes’ sovereign power).
116. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 59 (1831) (holding that the Supreme
Court did not have original jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation because they are a
dependent nation rather than a state or an independent nation).
117. See id. at 17 (suggesting that Indian nations are more akin to "domestic dependent
nations" rather than "foreign nations").
118. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (holding as unconstitutional a
Georgia statute prohibiting non-Indians from visiting tribal lands without a permit from the
state because the state had no authority over tribal affairs—that is the role of the federal
government).
119. Id. at 560–61.
120. See id. at 561 (concluding that tribes can maintain their right to government and
independent status while remaining under the protective powers of a "stronger" state).
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B. Federal Jurisdiction
The decisions in early Supreme Court cases led to the adoption of the
Federal Trust Doctrine.121 While scholars have struggled to define what the
trust doctrine actually is, the Department of the Interior treats the doctrine
as a symbol of the federal government’s duty to protect tribes, their land,
and natural resources.122 In a narrow sense, the doctrine bestows a fiduciary
responsibility on the federal government to protect tribes, but in a broader
sense, the federal government has a moral obligation to protect tribes
generally.123 This broad plenary power grants Congress almost completely
unfettered power to pass legislation with respect to tribes.124
Although federal agencies are not granted the same broad powers as
Congress, some departments, like the BIA, have acted as if they had the
same powers as Congress.125 The BIA operates under congressionally
mandated authority and is charged with managing reservation land under
the federal government’s designation as trustee.126 More specifically, the
BIA monitors land development by controlling resource allocation, contract
negotiation, and collecting royalties.127 Further, resource agreements and
leases are subject to BIA approval, and the BIA can overrule tribal council
decisions regarding use of tribal land.128
In 1961, the beginning of the Self-Determination Era, the federal
government began to lessen the amount of power departments like the BIA
could exercise.129 The Self-Determination Era is characterized by the
121. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 670 (introducing three U.S. Supreme Court cases,
referred to as the "Marshall trilogy," which addressed the issue of Native sovereignty).
122. See GILBERT L. HALL, THE FEDERAL INDIAN-TRUST RELATIONSHIP 2 (1979)
(defining the government’s responsibility "to protect valuable Indian lands, water minerals,
and other natural resources") (internal quotations omitted).
123. See Davies, supra note 3, at 308–09 (defining, in both specific and broad terms,
the obligation placed on the federal government by the trust doctrine).
124. See Jennifer Smith Haner, Tribal Solutions to On-Reservation Environmental
Offenses: Jurisdictional Parameters, Cultural Considerations, and Recommendations, 19
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105, 109 (1995) (identifying the predictable, preeminent power that the
federal government holds over "both tribal and state claims of authority").
125. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty:
The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1478–80 (1994) (outlining the
BIA’s role in managing the government’s duty to maintain federal Indian land).
126. See id. at 1478 (assigning the responsibility of managing the trust title vested in
the government to the BIA).
127. See id. at 1478–89 (setting out the day-to-day supervisory for which the BIA is
responsible).
128. See id. at 1479 (giving the BIA primary authority to review tribal decisions with
regard to certain uses of their land).
129. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 672 (discussing steps taken by Congress and
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federal government taking a more laissez-faire approach towards regulating
Native American affairs,130 as well as recognizing tribes as capable local
governments.131 Although President Lyndon Johnson, and later President
Richard Nixon, advocated for increased tribal participation in developing
federal programs for Native Americans,132 the advent of nuclear power
created complex problems for the ideology of the Self-Determination
Era.133
C. State Jurisdiction
The preceding discussion regarding federal power over tribes shows
the complexities involved in untangling tribes and the Federal Trust
Doctrine. Unfortunately, sorting out what powers States have over tribes is
just as complicated.134 Different rules apply depending on whether Native
or non-Natives are affected, whether Native-owned or non-Native-owned
property is involved, and whether the case is civil, criminal, or
regulatory.135 Basically, states are preempted from asserting authority over
Natives on tribal lands when state action would interfere with federal or
tribal interests.136 Conversely, states generally have authority to regulate
the actions of non-Natives on tribal land.137
States can gain civil and criminal jurisdiction over natives on tribal
land through a grant by Congress.138 In regard to regulatory authority, state
jurisdiction is based on a two-part test developed in two Supreme Court
federal agencies to loosen their grip over and promote autonomy within the tribes).
130. See id. (indicating the change in government oversight of the tribes to a "more
laissez-faire policy toward tribal relations").
131. See id. at 672–73 (detailing steps that the Environmental Protection Agency and
BIA have taken to allow tribes the opportunity "to develop their own solid waste disposal
programs . . . to make self-determination a reality").
132. See id. at 656 (analyzing executive policy during the "era of ‘Self
Determination’").
133. See supra notes 30–105 and accompanying text (describing the problems).
134. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 675 ("[T]he question of when state laws are
enforceable on reservation land is a much more complex and uncertain inquiry.").
135. See Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation
Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64
WASH. L. REV. 581, 597 & 606–07 (1989) (comparing various legal and regulatory standards
governing Natives and their land with those governing non-Natives and non-Native land).
136. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 676–79 (upholding the general principle set out in
the Worcester decision that states may not exercise jurisdiction over Indian Country).
137. See id. at 679–80 (discussing states’ jurisdiction over non-Native Americans on
reservations).
138. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (noting that acts of Congress
may give states power over the Cherokee nation).
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cases.139 The Court in Williams v. Lee140 established the first part of the
test, holding "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always
been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation [Native
Americans] to make their own laws and be ruled by them."141 However, the
focus on infringement was deemphasized by the Court in McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission.142 The Court held the proper test was not
only whether tribal custom or law preempted state involvement but whether
a Congressional power or statute did as well.143 Following the shift to a
preemption focus, a special preemption test was developed.144 The special
preemption test is basically a balancing test, which weighs federal and tribal
interests against a state’s interest in regulating an activity.145 The Supreme
Court further defined the test in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe146
by holding that state law is always preempted when it conflicts with federal
and tribal interests, unless the state interest is sufficient to override federal
or tribal authority.147 Thus, the special preemption test balances four
factors: tribal sovereignty, federal interests, tribal interests, and state
interests.148 Tribal self-determination, economic development, and health
and welfare are recognized as legitimate tribal and federal interests.149
139. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 676–77 ("State jurisdiction is now based on a
detailed factual analysis, structured around a two-part ‘preemption/infringement’ test, set out
in two United States Supreme Court opinions."); see also Haner, supra note 124, at 115
("State authority is determined by the application of a two-part test, the
‘infringement/preemption’ test.").
140. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that allowing the state to
exercise jurisdiction would undermine the authority of the tribal courts).
141. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
142. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1973) (noting
the power to tax reservation income is limited by treaty to the federal government and the
tribal government).
143. See id. at 178–80 (rejecting the position that state action need only avoid
infringing upon tribal self-government).
144. See Haner, supra note 124, at 115–16 (noting the Supreme Court’s preference for
preemption over infringement).
145. See id. at 116 ("The Court balances tribal, federal, and state interests in regulating
the activity, assessing the burdens and interests of each party.").
146. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 343–44 (1983)
(holding that when the "exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the State would effectively
nullify the Tribe’s unquestioned authority to regulate the use of its resources" and in "the
absence of State interests which justify the assertion of concurrent authority," the Tribe’s
interest is superior).
147. See id. at 334 ("State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless
the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.").
148. See Royster, supra note 135, at 644–49 (describing the component interests
balanced in the preemption analysis).
149. See Haner, supra note 124, at 117–18 (describing specific tribal and federal
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These interests must be balanced against a state’s interest in protecting its
economy and environmental resources and ensuring tribes do not receive
special economic advantages from adhering to less strict tribal
regulations.150
The Supreme Court held in Montana v. United States151 that states, not
tribes, have jurisdiction over non-Native Americans on tribal land.152
However, the Court held that one exception to this holding was that states
have no jurisdiction where a non-Native American party has entered into a
consensual agreement with a tribe or tribal members or in cases where tribal
sovereignty interests are at issue.153 Thus, if a tribe entered an agreement
with non-Native Americans to site nuclear waste on their tribal land, states
would not have jurisdiction over the corporation, or any individuals of the
corporation, constructing the waste facility or working at the waste facility.
Although tribes have sovereignty and control all self-governing
matters, it is clear that the federal government does have the ability to
control Tribes’ actions using the Federal Trust Doctrine.154 Further, the
courts have made it clear that, except in very limited circumstances, states
cannot control what Tribes do on their land.155 However, as the Goshute
tribe case study showed, the federal and state governments have still found
ways to block Tribal activities through federal legislation and lobbying
efforts.156

interests).
150. See id. at 118 (specifying relevant state interests to be balanced against tribal and
federal interests).
151. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (holding that "exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive
without express congressional delegation").
152. See id. at 565 (declaring that "Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent
with their diminished status as sovereigns").
153. See id. at 565–66 (reciting two retained inherent sovereign powers, one to regulate
"activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe" and the other to
"exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians . . . when that conduct threatens . . .
the political integrity . . . of the tribe").
154. See Davies, supra note 3, at 348 (noting that requiring federal approval for the
leasing of tribal lands negates the possibility of actual sovereignty).
155. See Royster, supra note 135, at 604 (describing the circumstances permitting state
jurisdiction over tribal lands).
156. See Davies, supra note 3, at 340–47 (chronicling the successful efforts by
opponents to prevent construction of a MRS facility on Goshute lands).
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IV. The Federal Communications Commission and the Siting of Cell
Towers
While the conflict between Native American sovereignty and the trust
doctrine is a complex issue, government agencies like the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) have been able to create a siting
system for cellular towers that enables tribes the freedom to allow cellular
towers to be sited on their land while still maintaining their full sovereign
status.157 Therefore, because cell towers and nuclear waste facilities are so
similar,158 delving into the history of the Federal Communications
Commission and the history of their cell tower siting practices can
illuminate solutions to the NRC’s nuclear waste siting problems.

A. How Cell Towers and Nuclear Waste Sites are Similar
Cell towers and nuclear waste facilities are more similar than they
might first appear. Siting both types of facilities creates issues concerning
the sacred nature of tribal land, technologies’ violation of nature, and safety
concerns.159 Further, both the cellular and nuclear industries are continuing
to expand, and the siting of facilities for both enterprises is only going to
grow in importance.160
Many tribes believe it is their duty to protect their land and the
environment.161 For them, the land is sacred and must be protected at all

157. See FCC, NATIONWIDE PROGRAMMATIC AGREEMENT FOR REVIEW OF EFFECTS ON
HISTORIC PROPERTIES FOR CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS, 12 (2004), available at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/siting/npa/tribal.html (follow "Full Text PA (PDF)" hyperlink)
(outlining procedures for siting cell phone towers and related communications respecting
tribal sovereignty).
158. See infra notes 159–191 and accompanying text (explaining the similarities
between cell towers and nuclear waste facilities from a siting perspective).
159. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 (discussing the sacred nature of tribal land and
technologies’ violation of nature); see also Cellular Phone Towers, AM. CANCER SOCIETY
(Jan. 31, 2006)
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/PED/content/PED_1_3X_Cellular_Phone_Towers.asp (last
visited Jan. 19, 2011) [hereinafter ACS] (discussing safety concerns) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
160. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing the mounting nuclear waste problem);
see
also
Wireless
Quick
Facts,
CTIA-THE
WIRELESS
ASS’N,
http://www.ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Jan. 19, 2011)
[hereinafter CTIA] (showing the increased usage of cellular phones) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
161. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 (noting that Native Americans feel a protective
duty for the land because it is sacred).
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costs.162 The construction of nuclear waste facilities significantly alters the
landscape,163 as do cell towers.164 The construction of both types of
facilities disturbs the ground they are built on and has the potential to
destroy archaeological sites.165
Some tribes believe that the creation of nuclear power violates
nature.166 Their rationale is that the atomic forces involved are sacred and
the act of splitting an atom harnesses a power fit for God, not humans.167 It
follows that if the creation of nuclear power violates nature, constructing
MRS facilities to store the nuclear waste would carry the same stigma. 168
While cellular technology does not involve the splitting of atoms, the
process by which cell phones work is highly scientific,169 and conservative
members of tribes may feel that this type of technology also intrudes on the
realm of God.170
Storing and transporting nuclear waste does carry a stigma of causing
environmental contamination,171 but the environmental impact statement
filed by the NRC, BIA, and BLM in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute
162. See id. (acknowledging the integral role of land in tribal culture).
163. See Cell Phone Tower Types and Information, STEEL IN THE AIR, INC.,
http://www.steelintheair.com/Cell-Phone-Tower.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (showing
images of constructed cell phone towers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also New Nuclear Waste Site for Sydney, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 22, 2008) http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/09/22/2370289.htm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2011) (illustrating the massive space necessary to store nuclear waste) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
164. See Brian R. Manuel, Protecting Historic Landscapes Against the Proliferation of
Cellular Towers, SJ053 ALI-ABA 307, 309 (2004) ("The effect of these modern day
monoliths on the landscape is substantial . . . .").
165. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, SECTION 106 ARCHAEOLOGY
GUIDANCE 20 (2009), available at http://www.achp.gov/archguide/ (follow the "PDF"
hyperlink) (acknowledging the potential of construction projects to disturb archaeological
sites, including those on tribal lands).
166. See WALLACE H. BLACK ELK & WILLIAM S. LYON, BLACK ELK: THE SACRED
WAYS OF A LAKOTA 37 (1990) (describing man’s creation of nuclear power as cosmic
misbehavior).
167. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 ("[T]he atomic force that binds the nucleus
together is a sacred force; splitting the atom and transmuting matter is viewed as an intrusion
into the realm of God . . . .").
168. See id. ("If nuclear power is viewed as a violation of nature, an MRS facility
would likely carry this same sense of impropriety.").
169. See Manuel, supra note 164, at 309–11 (explaining the technical, scientific aspect
of cell phone operation).
170. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 ("[T]ransmuting matter is viewed as an intrusion
into the realm of God . . . .").
171. See Collins, supra note 9, at 272–73 ("Fear of a nuclear accident dominates the
thinking of nuclear opponents, who argue strongly that both use and disposal of nuclear
materials are fraught with danger.").
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determined that the construction and operation of the proposed nuclear
waste facility would have little impact on the surrounding environment.172
Further, the environmental impact statement found that potential for
radiological harm to humans was very low. 173 The same is true for cell
towers.174 One of the largest environmental impacts caused by cell towers
is on migratory birds, and the FCC is continuing to investigate how large
the impact is.175 However, many people believe living in close proximity to
cell towers causes cancer due to the radiofrequency energy waves traveling
through the towers,176 although there has yet to be a conclusive study
linking cell towers to cancer.177
While nuclear waste is continuing to be stockpiled at nuclear power
plants and nuclear weapon facilities,178 the cellular industry is booming. 179
The growth of these two industries means that solutions to our nuclear
waste storage program and regulations for cell tower siting are two issues
that continue to grow in importance. Mounting stockpiles of nuclear waste
will pose significant problems in the near future for the federal
government.180 Stockpiles of nuclear waste and the cell phone industry are
both entities that continue to grow.181 As more consumers switch from
landlines to cellular phones,182 new cell towers are needed to improve
technology and bear the burden of increased airwave traffic, but where can
these cell towers be constructed? Cell towers are aesthetically unpleasing
and consumers worry the radiation from radiofrequencies increases cancer

172. See Davies, supra note 3, at 339–40 (detailing the environmental impact
statement’s conclusions regarding the risk of harm).
173. See id. at 340 (characterizing the danger of radiological harm as minimal).
174. See ACS, supra note 159 (stating that there is "very little" evidence of harm).
175. Catherine Wang, A Review of Wireless Developments: Oct. 2003–Sept. 2004,
813 PLI/PAT 103, 165–66 (2004).
176. See ACS, supra note 159 (stating that some people believe in a link between cell
phone towers and cancer).
177. See id. (stating that most studies show no link between cell phone use and
cancerous tumors).
178. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing nuclear power plants and nuclear
weapon facilities).
179. See CTIA, supra note 160 (discussing the cellular industry).
180. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (stating that the American government has found
no permanent solution to the stockpiling of nuclear waste).
181. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing nuclear power plants and nuclear
weapon facilities); CTIA, supra note 160 (discussing the cellular industry).
182. See Tim Barker, More People Drop Their Phone Landlines and Go Cell-only, ST.
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH,
Dec.
10,
2008,
http://www.allbusiness.com/mediatelecommunications/12004194-1.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (documenting increasing
numbers of consumers switching from land lines to cell phones) (on file with the Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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risks.183 Further, as new cell towers spring up around the country, they are
encroaching on land owned by Native American tribes.184 In order for
cellular companies to offer the type of service the public demands, they
have to expand their network coverage, and that includes building cell
towers on tribal land.185
The FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934 (Act of
1934).186 The main purpose of the Act of 1934 was to condense authority
over the licensing of wire and radio communications to one federal
agency.187 Therefore, because the FCC is responsible for the licensing of
telecommunications activities, cellular tower siting is under their
jurisdiction.188 The FCC has struggled at times to balance the public’s
desire for better cell phone technology with the requirements set forth in the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and some tribes’ desire to have
their land, religion, and society respected.189 The NHPA makes the federal
government responsible for protecting American history, archaeology, and
183. See Manuel, supra note 164 (registering the complaints against cell phone towers
as springing from their aesthetically displeasing nature); see also ACS, supra note 159
(noting that some people worry about radiological harm from cell phone towers).
184. See Marcia Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory
Responses to American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1645
(2004) (noting several instances of cell phone towers being built around sites sacred to
American Indians).
185. See Gregory A. Smith, The Role of Indian Tribes in Section 106 National Historic
Preservation Act Review Process, SJ053 ALI-ABA 649, 652 (2004) (stating that tribes have
received thousands of requests by service providers to build cell phone towers on tribal
lands).
186. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
187. See Gary A. Lehman, New Wave Policy: Protection of Direct Broadcast Satellite
Transmissions Under Section 605, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 590, 594 (1984) (stating that the law's
purpose was to centralize various federal agencies).
188. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., Selected Materials on Cellular Communication
Towers and Historic Preservation, SG040 ALI-ABA 275, 295-296 (2001) [hereinafter Nat’l
Trust for Historic Pres.] (stating that the FCC has regulatory powers over licensing
telecommunications activities).
189. See FCC, Learning Interactive Unit: Nationwide Programmatic Agreement,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/siting/npa/intro.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Learning
Interactive Unit] (stating that tribes that do want cell towers on their land feel that cell tower
construction companies have disrespected them by failing to treat them as sovereign nations)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see
also National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No.89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq. (2000)) ("The Congress finds and declares that . . .
historic properties significant to the Nation’s heritage are being lost or substantially
altered . . . ."); see also Press Release, FCC, Wireless Telecomm. Bureau Announces
Execution of Programmatic Agreement with Respect to Collocating Wireless Antennas on
Existing Structures, 16 FCC REC. 5574 (2001) [hereinafter Collocation Agreement] (setting
forth a series of operating principles agreed to by the FCC and historic preservation
organizations).
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culture from destruction and is triggered any time a project is determined to
be a federal undertaking.190 A federal undertaking is defined as "a project,
activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect
jurisdiction of a federal agency," and because the FCC regulates the
installation of all transmission frequencies, cell tower construction is
considered a federal undertaking.191 Thus, when cellular towers are
constructed, even on Native American land, a full NHPA review must be
undertaken.
B. History of How Federal Laws Have Shaped Cell Tower Regulation
Tribes are sometimes concerned that government projects, like cell
towers, not only destroy their land, but also destroy their culture.192 These
types of projects require facilities to be constructed on land that might
contain artifacts and burials important to tribal culture.193 The federal
government was aware of these concerns and thus included an important
requirement in any review of a project under the NHPA.194
This requirement is Section 106 of the NHPA, which makes the
federal government responsible for "tak[ing] into account the
effect . . . federal undertaking[s]" may have on historic properties.195 Once
the NHPA is triggered, cell tower construction companies must complete a
lengthy Section 106 review process before the project can commence.196
The NHPA also created the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
(ACHP), an independent federal agency,197 charged with promoting the
"preservation, enhancement, and productive use of our country’s historic
190. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2000).
191. Id. at § 470w(7).
192. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 (writing that American Indians hold land to be
integral to their cultural identity).
193. See id. (writing that American Indian cultural identity is intertwined with the land).
194. See Collocation Agreement, supra note 189 (noting the concerns of the tribes).
195. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (2000).
196. Id. The NHPA requires that:
[The] federal agency must make a reasonable and good faith effort to identify
historic properties, 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b); determine whether identified properties
are eligible for listing on the National Register based on criteria in 36 C.F.R. §
60.4; assess the effects of the undertaking on any eligible historic properties
found, 36 C.F .R. §§ 800.4(c), 800.5, 800.9(a); determine whether the effect will
be adverse, 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.5(c), 800.9(b); and avoid or mitigate any adverse
effects, 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.8(e), 800.9(c).
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir.1999).
19716 U.S.C. § 470i(a) (2000).
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resources."198 The ACHP reviews and comments on all federal projects that
qualify under the NHPA prior to their implementation.199 The ACHP
review process requires consultation with local State Historic Preservation
Officers (SHPOs),200 as well as local Native American tribes that might be
impacted.201 The ACHP ensures that cell tower construction companies
have consulted with SHPOs and have followed the protocol laid out in the
NHPA. However, the FCC’s desire to improve cellular technology across
the country has led to conflict with tribes and ultimately led to the FCC
implementing a revolutionary siting system for cell towers on tribal land.202
1. The Conflict Between the FCC, Cellular Companies, and Tribes
Although the Section 106 power is broad and far-reaching, the statute
specifically protects tribes by ordering any federal agency to "consult with
any [Native American] tribe . . . that attaches religious and cultural
significance to [a piece of] propert[y]."203
This requirement was
deemphasized in 1996, when Congress passed the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (Act of 1996)204 to "accelerate rapid[] private sector deployment of
advanced telecommunications and information technologies and
services . . . by opening all telecommunications markets to competition." 205
In order to rapidly advance telecommunication and information
technologies, the Act of 1996 put limitations on the zoning authority of
local governments to deny applications for the construction of cell
towers.206
198. See THE NAT’L HISTORIC PRES. ACT, CONN. TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES.,
http://www.cttrust.org/index.cgi/1047 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (detailing the history of the
National Historic Preservation Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
199. See id. (detailing the review process set up by the National Historic Preservation
Act).
200. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)(3)(I) (requiring SHPOs to consult with federal agencies in
any federal undertaking that may affect historic properties).
201. See id. at § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2000) (requiring the ACHP to consult with Native
American tribes when performing Section 106 reviews).
202. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
conflict).
203. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2000) (noting that Native Hawaiian groups must
also be consulted with, when applicable).
204. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
205. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
124.
206. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A)–(B) (2003) (limiting in certain situations the power
of local authorities to reject applications for cell phone tower construction).
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In line with the Act of 1996’s de-regulatory mandate, the FCC issued
its own regulations to fulfill its responsibilities under Section 106 of the
NHPA.207
The FCC’s regulations required the preparation of
environmental assessments and environment impact statements, as well as
coordination of Section 106 reviews.208 Under the new regulations,
companies engaged in the construction of cellular towers were required to
conduct environmental assessments for projects, which could affect the
entities listed in the NHPA.209 After an environmental assessment is filed
with the FCC, there is a thirty-day waiting period, and then the FCC either
approves the construction or requests the preparation of an environmental
impact statement to further review the effect the proposal will have on the
environment or historic resources.210 However, because the FCC uses an
honor system, in which the FCC relies on the cell tower construction
company to identify historic properties that might be affected, without the
input of the FCC or SHPOs, there is sometimes no oversight by the FCC.211
Until 1999, this lack of oversight had allowed tens of thousands of cell
towers to be built across the country without tribal consultation.212
In 1999, the FCC adopted new rules to conform with Section 106
regulations.213 The FCC’s new rules required cell tower construction
companies to consult with SHPOs and tribes, a rule that restricted the deregulatory mandate of the Act of 1996.214 However, the FCC’s new rules
opened the floodgates for Section 106 reviews for tribes and at SHPOs
across the country.215 Tower construction companies flooded tribes with

207. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1301–1.1319 (2009).
208. Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296. The major differences
between environmental assessments and environmental impact statements are that
environmental assessments are the precursor to environmental impact statements. JACOB I.
BREGMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 24 (2d ed. 1999). Environmental
assessments do not require that public meetings are held about the proposed project; almost
all the material used in the assessment is readily available, meaning no new material has
been collected for the assessment. Id. Further, environmental assessments are not required
to be published in the Federal Register. Id. Lastly, environmental assessments are
completed much more quickly than the lengthy environment impact statement process. Id.
209. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (noting the requirement
of environmental assessments).
210. See id. (describing the notification and approval procedure).
211. See id. (noting the lack of direct supervision).
212. See Smith, supra note 185, at 652 (noting that some of the tens of thousands of
towers built across America were built on American Indian cultural land).
213. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (2000).
214. See id. (requiring the FCC to consult with certain groups before becoming
involved in an undertaking).
215. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (recalling the thousands
of requests SHPOs have received to approve cell phone tower construction).
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requests for information about their land and often told the tribes if they did
not hear back within thirty days, they would assume their project would not
adversely affect tribal land.216 Problems were also created for SHPOs who
were overwhelmed by requests for Section 106 reviews, some for towers
that had already been built.217
None of the parties involved with the process were satisfied, and all
had specific complaints.218 Tower construction companies complained the
review process took too long and worried that the regulations protected
areas too strictly.219 SHPOs complained that because submissions from
tower construction companies were not standardized, submissions varied to
such a degree that review of them was sometimes impossible.220 Tribes
complained that cell tower construction companies felt they should not have
to compensate tribes for reviewing their applications.221 Tribes felt they
should be compensated for providing their expertise in reviewing
applications.222 Further, cell tower construction companies often failed to
contact tribes before they began construction.223 Even when tower
construction companies did contact tribes directly, they were violating the
tribe’s right as a sovereign entity to consult with the FCC privately
concerning a federal undertaking.224

216. See Smith, supra note 185, at 653 (stating that certain letters from cell phone
companies deeming a lack of objections on the tribe's part to be consent to build a cell phone
tower).
217. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (noting the flood of
Section 106 requests).
218. See Learning Interactive Unit, supra note 189 (noting the dissatisfaction amongst
interested parties).
219. See id. (referring to complaints from cell phone companies).
220. See id. (recalling that submissions SHPOs received from tower construction
companies, "varied in detail, format, and often were insufficient to perform a review").
221. See Smith, supra note 185, at 653 ("[C]ell tower companies, which stand to make
great profits from these towers, have with few exceptions, been unwilling to pay fees to
cover tribal costs.").
222. See id. (noting the costs and "onerous workload" that tribes have in responding to
cell phone tower location requests by cell phone companies).
223. See Learning Interactive Unit, supra note 189 ("[M]any Indian tribes reported
tower constructors frequently failed to contact them prior to construction, which,
unfortunately, on at least one occasion led to the destruction of a tribal sacred site.").
224. See Smith, supra note 185, at 653 (noting the tribes contention the cell phone
companies, by directly contacting the tribes, have violated the tribes’ "sovereign right to
consult" with the FCC).

A MODEL FOR SITING NUCLEAR WASTE

81

2. The FCC’s Solution to Cell Tower Siting
In order to address these issues, a "Working Group" was created
composed of members from the FCC, ACHP, SHPOs, Native American
tribes, the communications industry, and other historic preservation
consultants.225 The Working Group wanted to ease the burdens of all
parties involved in the cell tower siting process, and in March 2001, the
Working Group released the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement For The
Collocation of Wireless Antennas (Collocation Agreement).226 Collocation
arises in a situation where a cell tower company is hired to place a new, or
additional, antenna on a pre-existing tower, structure, or building.227 The
benefit of the Collocation Agreement is that it enables cell tower companies
to bypass the lengthy Section 106 review.228 However, the Collocation
Agreement only applied to existing towers, so the Working Group
developed another programmatic agreement in 2004: The Nationwide
Programmatic Agreement for Review of Effects on Historic Properties for
Certain Undertakings Approved by the Federal Communications
Commission (NPA).229
The NPA makes the Section 106 process much easier for all parties
involved in five specific ways.230 First, the NPA refines the process for
identifying land or buildings that may be harmed in the construction
process by requiring records kept at SHPO offices be reviewed.231 Second,
the NPA "[e]xclud[es] certain categories of undertakings from review that
225. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (detailing the creation of
a "working group" of interested parties).
226. Collocation Agreement, supra note 189.
227. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 297 (defining the term
"collocation").
228. See id. (detailing the four preconditions for bypassing Section 106 review).
229. Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the Section 106 Nat'l Historic
Pres. Act Review Process, 20 FCC REC. 1073 app. B (2004) [hereinafter Nationwide
Programmatic Agreement]. Two years before the NPA was released, the ACHP released a
letter to the FCC stating that when, in the course of Section 106 review, a tribe fulfills the
role of a consultant or contractor in regard to providing information, compensation for its
expertise is appropriate; however, applicants are not required to pay a fee, but they are still
responsible for obtaining the necessary information from the tribe. John M. Fowler, Letter
Relating to Payment of Fees in the Section 106 Review Process (Apr. 26, 2002), in THE
COMPLETE NPA USER’S MANUAL: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE AND REFERENCE FOR THE
NATIONWIDE PROGRAMMATIC AGREEMENT FOR SECTION 106 HISTORICAL PRESERVATION
REVIEW OF THE UNDERTAKINGS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 327–28
(John F. Clark ed., 2005) [hereinafter Fowler].
230. Learning Interactive Unit, supra note 189 ("The Nationwide Agreement improves
the Section 106 process in five principal ways . . . .").
231. Id. (noting that the first improvement is a "[r]efining [of] the process for
identifying ‘eligible properties,’ by requiring the use of records in the SHPO offices").
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. . . are not likely to adversely effect historic properties."232 Third,
procedures for contacting SHPOs were revamped to facilitate timely
communication.233 Further, the NPA grants construction companies the
ability to move forward with their project if the SHPO does not respond
within thirty days.234 Fourth, the NPA requires the use of uniform forms
when filing reports to SHPOs.235 Lastly, new guidelines were established
for consulting with Native American tribes.236
As part of the new guidelines, the FCC created an online database
called the Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS).237 Native
American tribes interested in siting cell towers on their land can upload
information about their land, including what areas would be disturbed by
tower construction, to help guide companies in selecting locations to build
towers.238 Further, the system can alert tribes when construction companies
have submitted proposals for towers that might affect them.239 By using the
system, tribes can begin discussions with tower construction companies and

232. Id. (detailing that the excluded categories of "undertakings include: (a)
Enhancements to towers; (b) Temporary Towers; (c) Replacement Towers; (d) Certain
Towers Constructed in Industrial and Commercial Areas; (e) Certain towers constructed in
Utility Corridor rights-of-way and (f) Towers constructed in SHPO/THPO designated
areas").
233. Id. (acknowledging the newly-established process by which to contact SHPOs).
234. Id. (stating that the process for contacting SHPOs now includes a "provision
authorizing tower constructors to proceed with construction if a SHPO does not respond
within thirty days").
235. Id. (noting the standard forms, called the submission packet).
236. See id. (mentioning that the final change is the advent of guidelines for "consulting
with federally recognized Indian tribes and NHOs"). The new guidelines reinforced the
regulations in place, requiring tower construction companies to contact and consult tribes
when the project would affect areas tribes had an interest in. Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement, supra note 229, at 1149–54.
237. See Harry Martin, New Tower Notification System, RADIO MAG. (Apr. 1, 2004,
12:00 PM), http://radiomagonline.com/fcc/radio_new_tower_notification/index.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2011) (announcing the new tower notification system) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
238. See
FCC,
TOWER
CONSTRUCTION
NOTIFICATION
SYSTEM,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/outreach/notification/TCNS_tribe.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2011)
[hereinafter TCNS] ("[TCNS] provides a means for Tribes, NHOs, and SHPOs to respond
directly to the companies if they have concerns about the proposed tower construction.") (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Nearly
600 Native American tribes have registered with the TCNS, including the Skull Valley
Goshute.
FCC, TOWER CONSTRUCTION NOTIFICATION SYSTEM:
TRIBES,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/outreach/index.htm?job=tower_notification (follow "Tribe/NHOs"
hyperlink beneath "Log In" button) (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
239. See TCNS, supra note 238 ("[The Tribe] may reply to a single notification [it has]
received regarding proposed tower construction.").
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their consultants more quickly.240 However, the TCNS is not a substitute
for Section 106 review,241 nor does the system alleviate the FCC of its duty
to consult with tribes on a government-to-government basis, because under
the TCNS the FCC acts as a "middle man."242 Proposals for new towers get
uploaded to the TCNS, and the FCC then forwards them to tribes who
might be interested.243 The tribes then respond to the FCC and those
messages are forwarded to the company who submitted the original
proposal.244
In 2006, the FCC unveiled the second generation TCNS.245 The new
version of the TCNS included some improvements to further streamline the
application process.246 The improvements for tribes included creating a
"batch reply" function for tribes to respond to multiple proposals at once; an
added language feature that enables tribes to create more detailed
preferences for what projects they would allow; an automated response
feature that enables tribes to send "canned" responses instead of
individually replying to every proposal; and a map function for tribes to
outline their geographic areas of interest in more detail.247 Once tribes have
accepted the proposal and the Section 106 review has taken place, cell
tower companies can negotiate terms of a lease and begin construction.248

240. See id. ("By making themselves available to receive notification of proposed tower
construction sites as early as possible, Tribes, NHOs, and SHPOs can increase their ability to
engage tower constructors and their consultants at an early date.").
241. See id. ("We emphasize to system users that the TCNS is a tool to facilitate
Section 106 Consultation. . . . The system is NOT to be used as a substitute for Section 106
Consultation.").
242. See id. ("The TCNS also enables the Commission to consult on a government-togovernment basis with federally-recognized Tribes at an early date.").
243. See Martin, supra note 237 ("The system streamlines the process, providing onestop shopping for tower proponents: They provide the FCC with the notification, and the
Commission then handles the dissemination of that information to organizations that might
be affected by the proposed construction.").
244. See id. ("Those entities may then submit responses back to the Commission, and
the Commission will forward those responses back to the notifier.").
245. See Marvin Webster, FCC Announces "Second Generation" Enhancements to Its
Tower Construction Notification System, ENVTL. CORP. OF AM., http://www.ecausa.com/files/ECA_TCNS_Enhance.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) ("The FCC’s public
demonstration of recent enhancements to the TCNS was webcast March 30, 2006.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
246. See id. ("These changes, which incorporated a new Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement (NPA) into the FCC environmental regulations, were designed to streamline
environmental processing of new wireless telecommunications facilities.").
247. Id.
248. See Nationwide Programmatic Agreement, supra note 229, at 1161 (stating that
companies can proceed with the project after a determination of "no [h]istoric [p]roperties
affected" or "no adverse effect").
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Since the Act of 1996, cell tower construction regulation has evolved
almost perfectly to protect tribal lands and sovereignty. Under the current
Collocation Agreement and NPA, tribes are assured of being involved in
the siting of cell towers on sites they have an interest in.249 Also, they can
receive consultation fees from construction companies to ease the burden of
reviewing applications, and lastly, the regulations in place protect the
sovereign status of tribes and enable them to consult solely with the FCC if
they choose.250 Due to the success of the cell tower siting practices by the
FCC and the similarities between cell towers and nuclear waste storage
facilities, the NRC should create a regulation system akin to the cellular
tower siting system currently in use by the FCC, so tribes can have the
option to site nuclear waste facilities on their land.
V. Creating a Siting System for Nuclear Waste Facilities
Open discussions between federal agencies, tribal groups, SHPOs, and
private contractors have helped the FCC create an ideal system for siting
cellular towers. This system enables tribes to retain their sovereign status,
allows cellular companies to receive prompt feedback concerning tower
proposals, and allows the FCC to satisfy all of the requirements set forth in
the NHPA.251 The FCC’s handling of cellular tower regulation provides a
template for how the NRC should create a siting system for nuclear waste
facilities on Native American land.
A. Problems with how the Nuclear Waste Regulatory System Currently
Functions
Before a nuclear waste regulatory system like the TCNS can be
created, jurisdictional issues must be resolved. First, Courts must continue
to rule that federal law preempts any state challenge to the construction of

249. See Collocation Agreement, supra note 189, app. A, at 5576 (stating the
Collocation Agreement does not preclude tribes from consulting with relevant parties when
tower construction might affect significant properties); see also Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement, supra note 229, app. B, at 1185–86 (recognizing the requirement for companies
to consult with tribes in the tower construction process).
250. See Fowler, supra note 229, at 327 (discussing consultation fees); see also TCNS,
supra note 238 (discussing regulations to protect a tribe’s sovereign status).
251. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (describing these benefits).
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nuclear waste facilities on tribal lands.252 Second, Congress must address
how tribal sovereignty and the trust doctrine can coexist.253
1. Courts Must Continue to Rule that Federal Law Preempts State
Challenges to Nuclear Waste Siting
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,254 states cannot reject the siting
of nuclear waste on tribal land, although they can voice their opinion on the
construction of a waste facility.255 Further, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
gave full responsibility to the federal government to dispose of, and
regulate, nuclear waste.256 Therefore, states should be preempted from
challenging proposed MRS sites on tribal land based on the power
bestowed on the federal government in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
While federal preemption can bar states from enacting legislation to
prevent nuclear waste from entering their borders, tribes also rely on their
sovereign status to protect their activities from attacks by states.257 The
Supreme Court, however, has recently started to erode the power vested by
sovereign status.258 The idea of Native American sovereignty has fallen
into disfavor with the Supreme Court, and the concept of sovereignty has
been replaced by an analysis of a tribe’s history and tradition of regulating
the issue in question.259 The Supreme Court’s decision to focus on a tribe’s
history and tradition of regulating an issue is problematic for deciding
whether states can preempt a MRS facility because while tribes have no
tradition of regulating nuclear waste, neither do states; the power to regulate
waste resides solely with the federal government.260 Therefore, regardless
252. See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1250
(D. Utah 2002) (holding that the Atomic Energy Act preempts state law), aff’d, Skull Valley
Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004).
253. Contra Davies, supra note 3, at 349 ("When the trust and sovereignty seek to
coexist, neither thrives.").
254. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2006).
255. See id. § 10121 (allowing state participation and consultation in the nuclear waste
siting process).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4) (2006).
257. See Frank R. Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36
S.D. L. REV. 239, 250 (1991) (recognizing the "apparent strength of independent tribal
sovereignty as its own barrier to state authority").
258. See id. at 252 (stating that Supreme Court legislation has abandoned the
infringement and preemption tests created in past cases).
259. See Collins, supra note 9, at 341 ("A relatively recent line of cases seems to
indicate that in certain areas, the Supreme Court is willing to let states interfere when the
tribes have no ‘tradition’ of regulation in the field at issue.").
260. See id. at 342–43 ("The federal government has long held the exclusive right to
regulate nuclear waste safety; neither tribe nor state, therefore, has a history of regulation in
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of tribal sovereignty, if the government grants tribes the right to store
nuclear waste, states have no standing to block nuclear waste from entering
their borders on its way to Native American reservations.261
2. The Conflict Between the Trust Doctrine and Tribal Sovereignty Must
Be Resolved
The second major issue involves trying to reconcile tribal sovereignty
and the Federal Trust Doctrine.262 In order for tribes to be able to site
nuclear waste facilities on their land, they must be able to exercise the
freedom afforded them by their sovereign status, without the federal
government using the trust doctrine to block the siting of nuclear waste
facilities. Tribes gain their power from sovereignty, which allows for selfgovernance and self-determination, while the trust is required to use its
power to make tribes submit to the federal government in order to protect
them. The problems created when tribal sovereignty and the trust doctrine
intersect were on display in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute.263 The
Goshute negotiated a lease with a private group to construct a MRS facility
on their land.264 This act was consistent with the sovereign powers tribes
historically enjoyed. However, the BIA stepped in and vetoed the proposal
because they felt the tribe’s future was at risk.265 The BIA’s actions are a
prime example of the trust overpowering sovereignty. The Goshute case
shows that as the trust doctrine and tribal sovereignty currently function,
they cannot coexist. One must dominate the other.
A new model for how tribal sovereignty and the Federal Trust
Doctrine interact is essential to resolve this conflict in order to prevent the
situation the Goshute faced from occurring again. Commentators have
proposed models across a wide spectrum, from nullifying the trust doctrine
in favor of tribal sovereignty to rejecting the idea of tribal sovereignty
this area.").
261. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that states may
not restrict movement of waste within its boundaries when the law is not directed toward
"legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental").
262. See Davies, supra note 3, at 328 ("The shape of tribal survival very much depends
on how the law reconciles a rule that at its core gives the federal government authority over
tribes as their purported protector—the trust—and another that seeks to allow tribes to mark
their own path—sovereignty.").
263. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (discussing the Skull Valley
Goshute’s interactions with the federal government in deciding whether to site a nuclear
waste facility on the tribe’s land).
264. Id.
265. See ISFSI, supra note 77, at 29 ("[U]ncertainty concerning when the SNF might
leave trust land, combined with the Secretary’s practical inability to remove or compel its
removal once deposited on the reservation, counsel disapproval of the proposed lease.").
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entirely. Professor Mary Christina Wood has proposed a model that
resolves the trust-sovereignty conflict by using the trust to ensure sovereign
power.266 Wood argues that the trust doctrine must protect four areas
essential to a tribe’s survival: the tribe’s land base, the tribe’s economy, the
tribe’s right to self-government, and the tribe’s culture.267 Wood’s model
protects these four areas by requiring agencies to review how proposed
projects would affect these four areas,268 and requiring courts to create a test
to determine whether a federal action interferes with these four areas.269
However, this model appears flawed because it does not resolve the trustsovereignty conflict, it simply has the trust prevail over sovereignty.
Further, if the trust doctrine is protecting a tribe’s land, economy, and
culture, the federal government may decide that those areas are at risk from
nuclear waste facilities and thus deny any proposals. If Wood’s model was
adopted during the Goshute’s struggle to site a MRS facility on their land, it
seems likely the outcome would have been the same.
Professor Stacy Leeds has taken the opposite approach from Wood and
argues that sovereignty should always prevail over the trust.270 For
sovereignty to overpower the trust, Leeds argues that title to Native
American lands must be conveyed to tribes,271 federal law must be changed
to completely preempt state challenges to tribal actions on tribal land,272

266. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New
Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 109, 231 (1995) ("[C]ourts should devise a substantive test to prioritize native property
and treaty resources in conflict situations involving threats from offreservation conduct . . . .
The substantive fiduciary test must be strict in order to adequately protect native interests.").
267. See id. at 113 ("[F]our ‘attributes of sovereignty’ . . . are necessary to native
separatism and warrant protection as beneficiary interests under the trust doctrine: (1) a
stable, separate land base; (2) a viable tribal economy; (3) self-government; and (4) cultural
vitality.").
268. See id. at 225 ("The procedural mandate [of the trust doctrine] requires an agency
to consider these effects of its actions on tribal property or other interests and assess its trust
obligation towards the tribe. The substantive mandate requires the agency to affirmatively
protect the tribe’s interests when it undertakes action.").
269. See id. at 223 ("[C]ourts should exercise independent scrutiny in determining
whether the proposed federal action interferes with . . . the . . . attributes of native
sovereignty."); see also id. at 231 ("[C]ourts should devise a substantive test . . . .").
270. See Stacy L. Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal Autonomy over Lands and
Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 455 (2006) ("I set forth a proposal for a
gradual end to federal supervision of Indian lands and a termination of the federal trusteeship
in favor of exclusive tribal autonomy.").
271. See id. at 456 ("In order to restore tribal autonomy, . . . [t]he first step is
conveyance of fee title from the federal government to the tribal government or the Indian
allottee.").
272. See id. at 457 ("To protect against state interference and preserve tribal autonomy,
the conveyances of fee title would need to be accompanied by changes in federal law.").
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and tribes must be allowed to decide if they desire federal supervision or if
the tribe wants to be completely autonomous.273
While Leeds’s proposal would ensure that tribes could site nuclear
waste facilities on their land without intervention from states or the federal
government, the proposal is still fraught with problems. First, if tribes are
given full sovereignty power, they could make decisions that lead to a
backlash from the rest of society.274 For example, if the Goshute had built a
nuclear waste facility without input from states or the federal government,
the entire state of Utah, and surrounding states, would have had to cope
with the nuclear waste being transported on public roadways. The safety of
millions of people would have been put at risk to benefit a small population
of Native Americans. Second, if tribes are given full sovereignty and
choose not to have any federal supervision, they run the risk of losing their
land entirely.275 For example, tribes could sell off almost all of their land or
tribes could enter ventures that permanently contaminate the land, making it
uninhabitable. Tribes suffer from extreme poverty,276 so it is possible that
tribes will make a detrimental decision regarding a venture because they
have no other means to produce income. For any perceived negatives
associated with the trust doctrine, one of the benefits of the doctrine is that
it has always preserved land for tribes to live on.277 Lastly, full tribal
sovereignty could silence internal dissent within tribes.278 With no federal
influence, leaders may become corrupt and silence any internal critics.279
Commentators like Reid Peyton Chambers have proposed a middle
ground, where neither the trust nor sovereignty rule over the other.280
273. See id. at 458 ("[F]or those tribes that choose to act as their own trustee over tribal
resources, the tribe will make the determination of whether its lands may be otherwise
encumbered as a matter of tribal law.").
274. See Davies, supra note 3, at 358 ("[T]he exercise of tribal sovereignty may visit
externalities on other parts of society . . . . Where such externalities exist, tribal sovereignty
risks inciting backlash from mainstream society . . . .").
275. See id. at 360 ("[C]ourts have relied on the trust as a way to protect tribal lands
from state jurisdiction and taxation . . . .
[I]f those barriers to assimilation are
removed . . . tribes will vanish one by one.").
276. See id. at 298 (asserting that poverty among the Skull Valley Band of Goshute
Indians is greater than three times the national average).
277. See id. at 360 ("[P]erhaps the trust’s biggest benefit is that, through its prohibition
on the alienation of tribal lands, the trust has helped preserve a space in which tribes can be
sovereign.").
278. See id. at 363 ("A final pitfall [of full sovereignty] is the risk that turning tribal
decisions entirely over to tribes will silence internal dissent.").
279. See id. (noting the concern that "removing federal oversight will lend itself to
increased leadership corruption").
280. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with
Self-Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal Trust
Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 2005 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13A (Sept. 27,
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Chambers’s proposal allows tribes to bypass federal authority when
entering into short-term land leases lasting up to thirty years, but requires
federal approval for leases lasting longer than thirty years.281 Also,
Chambers suggests the trust be used to judicially enforce a limitation on
congressional power, so the power of sovereignty cannot be lessened or
changed by Congress.282 However, this model does not resolve the trustsovereignty power struggle. Chambers’s proposal gives sovereignty more
power for any endeavor lasting up to thirty years, but switches power back
to the trust for an endeavor lasting longer than thirty years.283 Therefore,
the trust and sovereignty still conflict at the thirty-year mark.284
The Wood, Leeds, and Chambers models do not resolve the trustsovereignty issue; instead the models shift power from one side to the
other.285 However, Lincoln Davies has proposed a model that ignores
balancing the trust and sovereignty and instead bases the model on three
pillars essential for guaranteeing tribes sovereign status: full tribal selfdetermination, externality moderations, and sovereignty protection.286
Davies argues that the purpose of this model is not to give tribes supreme
power to overrule other jurisdictions; rather the model makes tribes
powerful enough to stand on equal footing with states, putting tribes in a
more powerful position for negotiations with other jurisdictions than they
currently are.287
Full tribal self-determination would give tribes the option to attain the
same levels of governmental power and responsibility that states enjoy.
Under Davies’s model, treating tribes as states gives the tribes more power,
2005) (discussing the consistency between the federal trust doctrine and tribal selfsovereignty) [hereinafter Chambers].
281. See id. at 13A-37 (discussing the approval requirements for longer term leases);
see also Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial
Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1084 (1974) (discussing
abolishing federal approval for short-term leases) [hereinafter Chambers & Price].
282. See Chambers, supra note 280, at 13A-41 ("[T]he question arises as to how the
trust responsibility can be better enforced. . . . [A] possible improvement could come from
increased use of the trust responsibility to enforce limitation upon congressional power.").
283. See Chambers & Price, supra note 281, at 1084 (discussing situations in which
Congress authorized tribes to lease lands for up to 30 years without approval).
284. See Davies, supra note 3, at 355 ("The two doctrines would still conflict . . . at
thirty years instead of zero.").
285. See id. at 353–55 (assert that Wood’s model promotes the trust doctrine over
sovereignty, that Chambers' model simply changes the time at which sovereignty and the
trust doctrine conflict, and that Leeds’s model elevates sovereignty over the trust doctrine).
286. See id. at 365 (discussing Davies’s proposed "three pillars . . . around which a new
model of greater sovereignty may be formed").
287. See id. at 374 (asserting that the proposed model would enable the Goshutes to
"ensure that they have the right to deal with [other] jurisdictions on a true government-togovernment basis").
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but also the responsibility for using that power in an appropriate manner.288
The most obvious example of Native Americans not having full selfdetermination was in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute.289 Because the
Goshute lacked full tribal self-determination, the federal government
essentially took away the Goshute’s most valuable resource, their land.290
Without the ability to lease their land to be used for the storage of nuclear
waste, the government took away an opportunity for the Goshute’s to revive
their tribe’s economy.291 Further, when tribes try to expand their sovereign
authority by acquiring additional land, the tribes submit to a slow, costly,
and complex BIA-administered process.292
Moreover, the federal
government has final approval of many tribal constitutions and elections,
thus infringing on tribal sovereignty further.293 All of this governmental
oversight has led tribes to believe they cannot really do anything without
the federal government approving their actions.294 States, in contrast, are
not subject to any of these rules and regulations.295 Under Davies’s model,
if tribes attain the same self-determination as states, they would control
taxing, policing, and zoning power over their land.296 Further, tribes could
exit the "boiler-plate" constitutions they entered in to under the IRA and
would be free to adopt constitutions tailored to their local circumstances
and traditions.297 The ability to create an independent form of government
is at the heart of full tribal self-determination.298
288. See id. at 367–68 ("Under my model, treating tribes as states not only importantly
expands what powers tribes may have, but gives them ultimate responsibility for carrying
them out.").
289. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text; see Davies, supra note 3, at 368
(stating that the Skull Valley Goshute provide the "most obvious" example of the issues that
arise with tribes not having true self-determination).
290. See Davies, supra note 3, at 368 ("Continuing federal oversight of tribal land
leasing drags down the value of tribes’ most valuable resource, [their land].").
291. See id. ("Continuing federal oversight of tribal land . . . run[s] the risk of thwarting
a tribe’s ability to revitalize, as the Goshutes’ believed nuclear storage would help them
do.").
292. See id. ("[T]ribes wishing to make additional lands subject to their sovereign
authority must submit to a complex BIA-administered process—one that has been criticized
as too slow, too costly, and too loathe to expand tribal jurisdiction.").
293. See id. ("[M]any tribal constitutions and elections currently operate under federal
approval and oversight.").
294. See id. ("Such pervasive federal involvement . . . has created the perception ‘on the
reservation . . . that the Indians may not do anything unless it is specifically permitted by the
government.’" (quoting Warren H. Cohen & Philip J. Mause, Note, The Indian: The
Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818, 1820 (1968))).
295. See id. ("By contrast, states have each of these [sovereign] powers by definition.").
296. See id. at 369 ("[T]ribes could use the model to exercise full zoning, police, and
tax powers over the breadth of their reservations, just as states do within their territories.").
297. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25
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Externality moderation is the force that would restrain a tribe’s full
self-determination.299 However, externality moderation is not analogous to
the trust doctrine; instead externality moderation is included to
acknowledge that every action by a sovereign entity can cause a reaction
from another entity. Therefore, externality moderation mitigates the
harm.300 Currently, tribes have no say when the federal government
exercises its plenary power, but externality moderation would put a halt to
Congress’s and the Courts’ ability to weaken tribal sovereignty and create a
system of rules and regulations that tribes would follow to gain such
protection.301 One challenge to this model is in determining what
constitutes an externality, and in turn, which federal laws tribes must
submit to in order to assure full sovereignty.302 The outcome may be that if
a tribe desired the full sovereign status enjoyed by states, they would have
to submit to all of the federal-state relations outlined in the Constitution.303
Tribes may see the adoption of externality moderation as the erosion of
their nation-like sovereignty, but seeing how their sovereignty has
constantly been attacked by Congress and the Courts, tribes may view
accepting externality moderation as favorable.304 Two safeguards would
U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2000)) (providing restrictions on Native Americans’ ability to develop
their own constitutions and bylaws); see also Davies, supra note 3, at 369 ("With this
authority, tribes might also seek to break free from the prescriptive model of the Indian
Reorganization Act-based constitutions and tune, just as states do, their governance systems
to better reflect their own local circumstances and tribal traditions.").
298. See Davies, supra note 3, at 369 ("[U]ltimately this is the core of what true tribal
self-determination must be about in the new model: tribes’ right to implement any mode of
government—whether modeled on the federal form or on native tradition, whether consistent
with their existing constitutions or different from them—without . . . federal meddling.").
299. See id. at 370 ("Mitigating externalities is the expectation that in order to exercise
greater sovereignty, tribes may need to submit to restraints on their power addressing these
harms.").
300. See id. ("[A]cceptance [to restraints on power] must not be seen . . . as
perpetuating a federal trust obligation . . . . Rather, its inclusion . . . acknowledges that
because the actions of every sovereign entity in this country can affect the others, there is a
need to moderate such harms in an evenhanded and fair way.").
301. See id. ("[W]hile today the plenary power limits tribal authority without tribal
consent, the new model would use externality moderation . . . to abolish Congress’s and
courts’ right to unilaterally diminish tribal sovereignty, and . . . to explicitly set forth the
conditions tribes must choose to accede in order to obtain such a strong protection.").
302. See id. ("Undoubtedly, a challenging facet here will be determining what
constitutes a tribal externality, and thus, what aspects of federal law tribes must submit to in
order to receive the model’s greater guarantee of sovereignty.").
303. See id. at 371 (discussing Constitutional regulations with which tribes may be
required to comply in order to receive full sovereignty under the model). For example, if a
tribe wanted full authority to buy, sell, or zone their reservation land, externality moderation
might require the tribe to submit to Fifth Amendment power. Id. at 370.
304. See supra notes 109–156 and accompanying text (discussing how sovereignty has
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prevent externality moderation from becoming analogous to the Federal
Trust Doctrine.305 First, there must be a clear division between the power
bestowed on the tribe and the restrictions placed on them, and second, the
restrictions placed on tribes must be the same type that states submit to in
exchange for sovereign power.306
Ensuring the protection of sovereignty is an obvious goal for any
model, but two questions remain: how to define the area of protection, and
how the protection should be implemented.307 The answer to the first
question is rather straightforward.308 The area to be protected should be a
tribe’s sovereignty over the land of their reservation.309 The reasoning is
three-fold: protecting a tribe’s reservation land would not require any
changes be made to the existing land, states already enjoy this type of
sovereign protection, and protecting tribes’ land allows tribes to exercise
the same, or more, sovereignty on the land they are likely to use their
sovereign power.310
There are three suggestions regarding the implementation of
sovereignty protection.311 First, the government could allow flexible
treaties that allow tribes to negotiate the level of sovereignty they desire. 312
been attacked by Congress and the Courts); see also Davies, supra note 3, at 371–72
("[S]ome tribes might see . . . moderation as a dilution of their historical
sovereignty . . . . Others, . . . [s]eeing the United States’ inconsistent diminishment of tribal
sovereignty in the past, . . . may view the trade of moderation for protection as favorable.").
305. See Davies, supra note 3, at 372 (suggesting that if the new model does not
provide certain assurances, "the condition of externality moderation would not be
moderation at all, but simply the trust by another name").
306. See id. ("[I]mplementation of the new model must be careful in ensuring . . . that
there is a clear nexus between the power the tribe is assured and the restriction it accepts
and . . . that the restriction . . . is only a uniform requirement . . . to which all states must
submit.").
307. See id. ("[T]he need for the final pillar of sovereignty protection should go without
saying. . . . The two critical questions are: How should the area of protection be defined,
and how should the protection be implemented?").
308. See id. ("The analogy of tribes to states should provide a straightforward answer to
the first question.").
309. See id. ("Traditionally, tribes were seen as having sovereignty within their
territories; that territory remains essential to their sovereignty today; and thus, tribal
sovereignty should be protected within the boundaries of tribal reservations.").
310. See id. at 372–73 ("It requires no manipulation of the existing landscape. It is the
same kind of sovereignty protection that states have. And it would allow for tribes either to
continue the same level of sovereignty they now exercise, or to exercise more
jurisdiction . . . .").
311. See id. at 373 ("As to the second question—how to implement this sovereign
protection—there are a number of options.").
312. See id. ("[T]he government could void its ban on tribal treaties and create a pro
forma treaty that would guarantee a minimum level of sovereignty for all tribes, but could be
modified in particular circumstances via negotiation.").
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Negotiation may not be the best option because the resources expended
during the process could be enormous if every tribe enters in to separate
negotiations with the government.313 Second, the option for sovereignty
protection could be installed as federal law.314 This option is risky because
it could allow a subsequent legislature to completely annul the sovereign
protection; however, this option would create a better system of sovereignty
than is currently enjoyed by tribes.315 Lastly, provisions could be added to
the Federal Constitution to guarantee tribes sovereignty and conditions for
opting in to the protection.316 Amending the Constitution is the most
difficult option to implement based on how difficult it is to make
amendments to the Constitution and the possibility that states may feel
tribes are being provided a special status.317 However, it is the most
powerful and optimal solution based on its permanency, and for those
reasons should at least be attempted.318
It is impossible to say if the Skull Valley Goshute would have been
successful in siting their MRS facility even if they had been able to fully
adopt this proposed model. The BIA would have been unable to deny the
proposal between the Goshute and the MRS consortium, but the Goshute
would not have been protected from Congress creating a wilderness area
and thus blocking the avenues for nuclear waste to be delivered to the
reservation.319 Therefore, while the first step in allowing tribes to build
nuclear waste facilities on their reservation is giving tribes full selfdetermination and sovereignty protection, the second step is creating a new
regulation system so tribes do not face attacks from surrounding states and
federal legislatures.

313. See id. ("The negotiation path would consume enormous resources if conducted
tribe-by-tribe . . . .").
314. See id. ("Another option would be to install the protection as a matter of law.").
315. See id. ("The codification avenue risks complete annulment by a subsequent
legislature—especially in the absence of a meaningful judicial restraint that the trust has for
centuries failed to provide—though this approach would be a substantial improvement on
the existing status quo.").
316. See id. ("The most protective [option] would be to add to the Federal Constitution
provisions guaranteeing tribes their sovereignty and defining the terms and conditions by
which they may opt into that protection.").
317. See id. (asserting that the constitutional option’s "obstacle is that any constitutional
amendment is difficult to achieve today. When the amendment is one that some might . . .
attempt to characterize as providing ‘special’ status to tribes, its success likely would be
even more difficult to broker . . . .").
318. See id. ("The constitutional possibility is the most promising and most
admirable.").
319. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (discussing the BIA’s rejection of
the Goshute’s proposal to build a nuclear waste facility on Goshute land).
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B. Proposal for a New Nuclear Waste Siting System

The main issue with setting up a regulation system to allow Native
Americans to enter into negotiations to site a nuclear waste facility on their
land is creating a system that enables tribes to preserve their sovereign
status through negotiations with private construction companies. The
solution to this issue lies in the procedures for cell tower siting. There are
many similarities between nuclear waste facilities and cellular towers,320
and both are types of facilities that Native Americans are faced with
constructing on their land. Whereas siting nuclear waste facilities has been
a complete failure so far, siting cellular towers has steadily progressed due
to regulations implemented by the FCC.321 Just as the FCC is charged with
regulating the licensing of wireless facilities,322 the NRC is responsible for
the regulation of nuclear waste and should therefore be charged with
creating a siting system.323 The system should start with an online database
much like the one created for the TCNS.324
For tribes, the system can work in two different ways. First, tribes
could upload geographic and topographic information into the database
making this information viewable by private construction companies
looking to build nuclear waste facilities. If a private construction company
identifies a tribe they are interested in negotiating with, the company can
either contact the tribe directly through the system, or, if tribes want to
maintain their sovereign rights to communicate government-to-government,
the company could contact the NRC, which would in turn contact the tribe
directly. The other option would have construction companies identify
geographic regions they are interested in, and the system could then send
notices to tribes in those geographic areas. Once the notice is received,
tribes could respond directly to the construction company, or through the
NRC, stating whether they were interested in the proposal.

320. See supra notes 159–191 and accompanying text (noting the similarities between
cell towers and nuclear waste sites).
321. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC’s solution
for cell tower siting).
322. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, I §1 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)) (granting the FCC authority to regulate the licensing of
wireless facilities); see also Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 295 ("The
Federal Communications Commission is the agency responsible for licensing
telecommunication activities in the United States.").
323. See 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1974) (discussing the government’s objectives with respect
to nuclear energy sources).
324. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (discussing the TCNS online
database).
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If tribes are interested in the proposal, they could move on to the next
phase. The next phase would include filing appropriate environmental
impact statements with the NRC, as well as going through a Section 106
review. Further, all proposals would include protocol for procedures in the
event of an accident. The NRC, as the regulating and licensing body,
should be in charge of creating these procedures.325 If the NRC accepts the
proposal, final lease terms could be negotiated between the tribe and
construction company. The NRC should still serve their regulatory
function and inspect the facilities on a yearly basis to determine if both
parties are adhering to the lease terms.
Assuming tribes are given full self-determination and sovereignty
protection, states and the BIA would not be in a position to block the
construction. Further, because of the yearly inspections by the NRC, and
assuming the environmental impact statements found low potential risk of
harm, Congress would be less likely to oppose the project. Moreover, with
the discontinuation of the Yucca Mountain program, Congress should be
more willing to construct MRS facilities, which seem to be one option
currently available.326 It is clear the waste needs to go somewhere, and if
tribes are willing to shoulder the burden, they should be allowed the
opportunity to pursue these projects.
VI. Conclusion
Even though the amount of nuclear waste continues to increase in the
United States, the federal government has not been able to find suitable
means for safely, and permanently, storing the waste.327 One possibility for
siting our country’s nuclear waste involves having Native American tribes,
like the Skull Valley Goshute, build nuclear waste facilities on their tribal
land. However, these proposals have met fierce opposition, both politically
and legally.328 The Skull Valley Goshute case reveals that at the heart of
the debate regarding nuclear waste siting on tribal land is the issue of how
325. Procedures should include what to do if the MRS facilities fail and land is
contaminated, if trucks carrying nuclear waste to the site are involved in accidents and
nuclear waste is spilled in surrounding areas, and what penalties should be levied if terms of
the agreement are not followed.
326. See Mountain of Trouble, supra note 1 ("Now that the Yucca Mountain project is
dead the obvious question is: Now what? As a senator in 2007, Mr. Obama
suggested . . . ‘finding another state willing to serve as a permanent national
repository . . . .’").
327. See supra notes 30–55 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
government’s attempts at siting nuclear waste facilities).
328. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (discussing the Skull Valley
Goshute tribe’s efforts to obtain a nuclear waste facility).

96

2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 51 (2011)

to resolve the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine and Native
American sovereign status, a conflict with deep historical roots.329 To
resolve this conflict, tribes must be guaranteed sovereign status through full
tribal self-determination, externality moderation, and sovereignty
protection.330
Once Native American sovereign status is guaranteed, the federal
government can consider how facilities like cellular towers have been sited,
and implement a nuclear waste siting system akin to the FCC’s TCNS. Part
of the reason the TCNS has been so successful is because government
organizations, tribes, and cellular tower construction companies all voiced
their opinions on how a cellular tower siting system should work.331 The
FCC was able to take the opinions of the parties involved and create a siting
system that fully respects tribal sovereignty while shortening the review
process for cellular tower construction companies.332 The goals of any
nuclear waste storage siting system should be to allow tribes to enter into
financially beneficial nuclear waste siting contracts as sovereign entities.
Nuclear waste carries an intense stigma that is extremely difficult to
overcome.333 However, the safe disposal of nuclear waste is an issue that
cannot and will not disappear. No one wants a nuclear waste facility sited
in their backyard, but the reality is the waste has to go somewhere, and
therefore when a city, state, or tribal group makes the determination to bear
the load, the states and government should help tribes do it in the safest way
possible, instead of trying to block the project through protests and
legislation.

329. Id.
330. See supra notes 251–326 and accompanying text (outlining a model aimed at
resolving issues faced in the construction of nuclear waste facilities on Native American
land).
331. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (discussing the communication
between tribes, cellular tower construction companies, and government entities).
332. Id.
333. See Collins, supra note 9, at 272–73 (discussing the public perception of nuclear
power and nuclear waste).

